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Side-Channel communication is a form of traffic in which malicious parties communicate 
secretly over a wireless network. This is often established through the modification of Ethernet 
frame header fields, such as the Frame Check Sequence (FCS). The FCS is responsible for 
determining whether or not a frame has been corrupted in transmission, and contains a value 
calculated through the use of a predetermined polynomial. A malicious party may send 
messages that appear as nothing more than naturally corrupted noise on a network to those 
who are not the intended recipient. A Hamming Distance (HD) difference between the FCS 
values of purposely corrupted and naturally corrupted frames is proposed as a metric for the 
detection of side channel communication. In theory, it should be possible to recognize 
purposely corrupted frames based on how high this HD value is, as it signifies how many bits 
are different between the expected and the received FCS values. It is hypothesized that a range 
of threshold values based on this metric exists, which may allow for the detection of Side-
Channel communication across all scenarios. In order to achieve this threshold range, a 
calculation known as F-Score has been used. Several approaches to verifying the F-Score 
thresholds have been presented to verify this range, as well as the validity of F-Score itself such 
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Chapter 1- Introduction 
Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks (MANETS) provide an easily configurable mobile platform where 
nodes can communicate without requiring the use of additional hardware to provide routing. 
While convenient, these networks are not without their share of drawbacks in terms of 
security, management, or packet loss. As with all wireless networks, there is some level of 
information loss or corruption due to signal fading, frame collisions, or environmental 
interference. As a result, frames can become corrupt and will be disregarded by wireless 
receivers as noise. Side-Channel communication takes advantage of this as a method for 
discretely transmitting messages between two or more nodes. This process can be difficult to 
detect since it is hard to tell these intentionally corrupted messages from naturally corrupted 
ones; unfortunately for other nodes in a network, both appear as noise. Through the use of 
frame manipulation, it is possible for a malicious party to modify a frame in order for it to 
appear corrupted. Upon receiving a corrupted frame, most nodes will simply discard the frame, 
disregarding its existence. This behaviour is expected for all nodes on a network, unless the 
recipient has been configured in order to correctly receive and decode these secret frames. This 
type of communication is described as “Side-Channel Communication”, and while the process is 
conceptually simple to achieve, finding adequate hardware that supports the functionality 
required is rather difficult. Detection of frames based on this form of communication provide 
the foundation for the research presented throughout this thesis. 
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A network frame has several fields that are used for a variety of functions in transit, 
such as the source and destination fields.  The field responsible for determining whether or not 
a frame has been corrupted in transmission is known as the Frame Check Sequence (FCS), and is 
a four-octet length field containing a value that is calculated prior to transmission [1]. Upon 
arrival, the receiver node utilizes an agreed upon algorithm in an attempt to re-calculate the 
value of the frame’s FCS field via a Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC). If the calculated value 
matches the FCS field’s value, then the frame has arrived safely; however, if the calculated FCS 
value does not match the one present in the frame, the frame is considered corrupted and 
immediately discarded by the node.  
1.1 - Problem Statement 
A common question that occurs is “Why go through the effort of establishing a Side-Channel, 
when the transmission can be encrypted?” The reason for this is that while encrypted messages 
may be difficult to decode, they are not an inconspicuous means of communication. This is 
where network steganography techniques such as Side-Channel communication come in, as 
they allow multiple users the opportunity to transmit secret messages in plain sight. One of the 
main reasons why Side-Channel communication is so difficult to recognize is that there is no 
discernible difference between malicious Side-Channel frames, and those that were naturally 
corrupted through the transmission process. 
In previous works [2], it was suggested that an increase in Side-Channel frames would 
provide an easily recognizable increase in Frame Error Rate (FER), to the point where a network 
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with Side-Channel would have a noticeably larger volume of errors than those without. Since 
these Side-Channel messages appear as nothing more than corrupted frames to average nodes, 
logically a substantial increase in corrupted messages on the network would provide evidence 
that Side-Channel must be occurring; however, this is not necessarily true. Since there are a 
variety of factors that could influence a wireless network, the amount of FER is never truly 
consistent. The level of noise on a network could change completely erratically, and almost 
arbitrarily. Many errors that occur in a wireless network may be triggered by seemingly 
inconsequential events, such as an individual walking through the transmission zone, a 
microwave or other device operating on the same frequency, nearby construction, or even 
changes in weather. With no persistent baseline for comparison, this eliminated the possibility 
of utilizing FER as a detection metric.  
When determining a metric for use in detecting anomalous behaviour, such as Side-
Channel, one of the requirements is that it must provide consistent results. In dealing with a 
MANET environment, this becomes increasingly more challenging as there is no guarantee of 
the surroundings or reliability of the network. There is also very little control over factors such 
as interference, and as such, the metric must be unaffected by FER. If such a metric is found, 
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1.2 – Contributions 
Due to the fact that FER is such an unreliable variable, there is a need for a detection metric 
uninfluenced by its fluctuations. The Hamming Distance (HD) calculation based on a frame’s 
CRC polynomial appears to fulfill this requirement. There is a notable difference between the 
CRC value of Side-Channel frames using a modified CRC calculation and those using a standard 
algorithm, which will be touched upon further in Section 2.4. The difference between these 
values, or delta-CRC, is calculated by performing an XOR between the expected CRC value and 
the received one in order to compute an HD [3]. This metric was tested against a static ad-hoc 
scenario [3], and validated through various methods which will be described more in-depth in 
the Related Works section. While the HD metric appears to be relatively unaffected by factors 
such as FER, there are still several aspects of the work left to explore. This work provides four 
major contributions to the topic: 
 Testing of the HD threshold technique against multiple MANET experiment scenarios in 
order to evaluate its effectiveness 
 Determining a threshold range using a mathematical calculation known as “F-Score” to  
detect Side-Channel communications in MANETs when a Side-Channel is created by 
modifying the CRC polynomial 
 Testing the validity of the F-Score approach by graphing the test against various datasets 
using an ROC curve 
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 Provides additional validation of the HD as a metric by performing analysis using the 
Support Vector Machine learning algorithm 
1.3 – Structure of Thesis 
The structure of this thesis was designed to provide the reader with the knowledge necessary 
to understand exactly what a Side-Channel is, along with many of the mechanics necessary for 
detection. Once the appropriate background concepts have been established, information 
regarding scenario procedures will be presented. Having a thorough understanding of the 
concepts, the reader should then be able to examine the results. In Chapter 2, previous works 
in the field will be examined. While Side-Channel communication is a relatively 
underrepresented area of research, there are a number of quintessential papers that provide 
the foundation for the concept. The aim of this chapter is to show just how challenging of an 
issue it is to not only detect Side-Channel, but also establish an adequate testing environment. 
In Chapter 3, the reader will be presented with the fundamentals necessary to understand the 
concepts of Side-Channel, the HD metric, and Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks. These areas provide 
insight that should help to understand the experimental design choices shown in the following 
chapter. Chapter 4 explains why simulation wasn’t possible for this unique problem; how the 
OLSR routing protocol works; a very basic explanation of Platooning; and the parameters and 
methodologies used to conduct and analyze the experiments. Chapter 5 is where the 
information captured in the experiments comes to life in a series of figures that showcase the 
results, and alternative methodologies. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes by recognizing how the 
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contributions of this work impact the field, and possible directions for further examination of 
the Side-Channel problem.  
 
Moore | 7  
 
Chapter 2 – Background & Related Work 
2.1 – Steganography 
In order to properly assess the detection of Side-Channel communication, it is important to 
understand where the concept originated, and analyze previously suggested detection 
methods. Steganography is a form of covert communication that dates back several  
millennia [4]. During this archaic era, messages were sent between generals by hiding them on 
the reverse of wax writing tables, on the stomachs of rabbits, and by tattooing them on the 
scalps of slaves [4]. Steganography was also used throughout the World Wars, where spies 
were able to use more advanced techniques, accredited to the invention of photography and 
technologies such as Microdots or Microfilm [5]. Steganography is used to hide a covert 
message, but does not hide the fact that two parties are in communications [4]. In the internet 
age, steganography is most commonly linked with techniques involving graphical images or 
audio files as a carrier medium; however, this is not the only digital steganography currently in 
practice.  
 The research presented by Szczypiorski [6] may be accredited as one of the pioneering 
articles in the topic of Network Steganography, inspiring a large amount of interest in the field. 
While most implementations of steganography systems are typically dedicated to multimedia, 
the research presented in HICCUPS: Hidden Communication System for Corrupted Networks [6] 
offers a unique approach, aiming to develop a steganographic system from a network 
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perspective. Even though research in network steganography is not that uncommon, many of 
the techniques examined rely on optional packet header fields belonging to very specific 
network protocols [7] [8] [9]. HICCUPS [6] was developed with the idea that if messages are 
modified at the Data Link Layer of the OSI model, it is possible to take advantage of naturally 
occurring imperfections in network transmission, such as noise. It is believed that this system 
offers an advantage over many of the other implementations in that it does not require any 
specific protocol. The results of the study by Szczypiorski [6] concluded that while 
steganographic communication may be possible, there are very specific and challenging criteria 
that must be met. As Szczypiorski [6] suggests, one of the issues with developing this form of 
Side-Channel is that there is a distinct lack of network interface cards that allow for the 
modification of frame header fields, such as the FCS field. 
In a standard wireless network, all devices receive a copy of each message sent but 
often disregard those messages when they are not the intended recipients. This functionality 
stems from the use of CSMA (Carrier Sense Multiple Access) and CSMA/CD (CSMA with Collision 
Detection) protocols on a network. These protocols operate at the Data Link Layer, and 
measure a network for an absence of traffic prior to transmission. The intended usage for these 
protocols is to ensure that data collisions do not occur, or occur less frequently on a shared 
medium such as a wireless frequency. Szczypiorski [6] identifies these protocols as one of the 
three properties required for a working implementation of HICCUPS to exist. 
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The three requirements that must be met by a network susceptible to HICCUPS [6] are: 
a shared medium network with some form of CSMA; a publicly known method of cipher 
initiation (such as initiation vectors); and finally, integrity mechanisms for encrypted frames 
(such as FCS).  The CSMA requirement stems from the fact that this mechanism gives all nodes 
the ability to “hear” all traffic on the network, meaning that malicious parties can analyze the 
traffic to find exploitable features. Three possible mechanisms that may be exploited to allow 
for the creation of a Side-Channel were also outlined in his work [6]: a channel based on a 
corrupted FCS field; a channel based on MAC network addresses; and a channel based on a 
cipher’s initialization vectors. 
The Initialization Vector channel requires all devices involved to be included within a 
hidden group that establishes a secret key for ciphers embedded in a steganographic system. 
This method was designed to work in a unicast, multicast or even broadcast mode utilizing the 
Diffie-Hellman algorithm for key exchange among nodes. A major drawback to a system of this 
type is that key exchange is difficult to mask from observers, requiring operation on a standard 
channel [6]. The second channel proposed by Szczypiorski [6] was entitled the “Basic Channel”, 
the establishment of which requires a cipher’s initialization vectors and MAC network 
addresses. It is suggested that the primary purpose of this mode was to allow for a channel 
characterized by low bandwidth where the exchange of control messages among hidden group 
stations occurs [6]. The third and final suggested Side-Channel has been referred to as 
“Corrupted Frame Mode” [6]. The detection and prevention of the “Corrupted Frame Mode” 
channel form the reasoning for this thesis. Szczypiorski [6] proposed that information could be 
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exchanged through frames which feature intentionally created corrupt FCS fields. The benefit of 
a channel of this design is that it provides the ability to utilize nearly 100% of the bandwidth for 
a certain period, and relying on the functionality of CSMA, nodes that are not the intended 
recipients will simply discard these frames as noise. Szczypiorski [6] felt that this method was 
out of the scope of his research, as he was unable to acquire a network interface card allowing 
for the manual modification of CRC checksums. While initial research on his third proposed 
channel was left largely untested in his work, it has become the focus of many works involving 
the Defence Research & Development Canada (DRDC) and the University of Ontario Institute of 
Technology (UOIT) [3] [10] [11]. 
2.2 – Anomaly Detection 
Anomaly Detection mechanisms are often an alternative to everyday anti-malware or firewall 
solutions. These systems can offer an advantage over conventional intrusion detection methods 
in that they are not reliant on the use of a signature database. Some of the detection methods 
examined in this research include network traffic analysis, behaviour analysis, and smartphone 
security. While not all of these systems are network oriented, many of their functions and 
properties were considered as potential monitoring techniques. 
 In recent years, anomaly detection has received extensive interest from the academic 
community. While there are many researchers looking to develop the next Intrusion Detection 
System (IDS) through the use of machine learning or behavioral analysis, very few have had 
success with acquiring mainstream usage. Many of these systems employ the use of machine 
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learning algorithms, and several [12] [13] [14] were successful in their implementations; even 
so, anomaly detection is still not as mainstream as conventional anti-malware solutions. 
Sommer et al. [13] attribute the scarcity of such systems to the fact that the intrusion detection 
domain has been established for so long that there is a high barrier to entry for new 
applications. 
In the field of intrusion detection, there is a high cost of failure if a misclassification 
were to occur. A false positive is often considered an inconvenience, and may require I.T. 
personnel resources to be spent examining incident reports for an alert that was triggered in 
error. Even a small rate of false positives can render a network intrusion detection system 
unusable [13]. On the other side of this scale, false negatives exhibit catastrophic results in 
which information is compromised, systems are damaged, or a loss of service occurs. While the 
usage of Machine Learning algorithms and other automated systems may offer several benefits 
for network monitoring, many of the systems employing anomaly detection often feature a 
false positive rate that may be considered unacceptably high [15] [16]. 
 Sommer et al. [13] outlined several issues affecting the adoption of machine learning 
anomaly detection methodologies. Such issues include: the distinct lack of classification, the 
diversity in the forms network traffic can take, and the difficulties with evaluation. Further 
research on anomaly detection from Bolzoni et al. [17] explains that when alerts are raised by 
anomaly-based IDSs, the system is able to detect the anomaly, but has too little information to 
determine a classification for the attack. This limitation suggests that many anomaly-based 
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alerts require manual processing by I.T. personnel in order to classify an alert. Not only would 
this increase the work required by security teams, but also the time required to appropriately 
respond to the situation. Panacea [17] is a system that uses machine learning techniques to 
automatically and systematically classify attacks identified by an anomaly-based intrusion 
detection system, using information gathered about their payload. The idea behind such a 
system as Panacea [17] is the fact that attacks will often share common patterns in their 
payloads, such as byte-sequences. By examining this pattern, it is likely that there is an attack 
occurring belonging to a specific class, and an alert can be triggered. 
Network characteristics such as bandwidth, application support, and network policies 
governing the length of a connection are all features that can prohibit widespread adoption of 
anomaly detection systems when dealing with network intrusion detection. When taking data 
for training phases, one of the most difficult considerations when dealing with networks 
concerns usage patterns. For example, usage can be highly variable over certain time intervals, 
resulting in many false positives when using a detection method heavily reliant on network 
patterns as a metric; while fluctuations are less notable over a large sample size, network traffic 
can see significant increases and decreases on an hourly basis. It is worth noting that a flux in 
usage is not the only observable challenge. Protocol specifications may operate in such a way 
that their behavior and the amount of traffic they produce varies, depending on the level of 
heterogeneity across the network, or based on the status of the current communication 
session. 
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Another challenge that the implementation of an anomaly detection system faces is in 
regards to determining a proper evaluation of the mechanism. Traditional signature-based anti-
malware systems or other IDS systems such as firewalls often have access to publically available 
testing data or communities that produce content for testing purposes. An example of these 
tools comes in the form of voluntary spam requests [18], which allow for I.T. personnel to test 
their mail filters. When attempting to evaluate anomaly detection mechanisms, there is a 
limited amount of available datasets for appraisal, meaning that the evaluation process can be 
quite difficult. Should anomaly detection see more widespread usage in the future, or if 
researchers begin to focus their efforts on the development aspect of anomaly detection, 
evaluation of these systems could become much easier. 
Many network operators utilize a system known as deep packet inspection (DPI) [19] 
[20]. DPI involves examining application layer protocols and content, such as port destinations, 
in order to monitor and control activity on a network. These systems are most frequently used 
in organizations, or countries with heavy restrictions on the content available to the general 
public. While effective for general purpose network monitoring, they are susceptible to exploits 
such as Protocol Misidentification or Polymorphic Blending Attacks [19] [21]. 
Protocol Misidentification is the process of labeling a packet designed to operate with a 
certain application layer protocol as another. Using this system, it is possible to bypass 
detection systems which employ DPI. For example, in an environment where FTP traffic is 
prohibited, a malicious party could mask the port number and protocol information attached to 
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outbound packets, and disguise them as HTTP traffic destined for port 80. This allows for a 
bypass around many network IDS systems and filters. To demonstrate this capability,  
Dyer et al. [19] proposed a system known as FTE (format-transforming encryption). FTE was 
capable of transforming ciphertext into a format of their choosing in order to bypass DPI. In 
addition to this functionality, the system can also act as a proxy for communication outside of 
restrictive countries or networks, with little to no bandwidth overhead. A counter to this form 
of attack would be to place a limitation on the types of protocols allowed to be transmitted 
across a network, but even this solution faces limitations. Users could determine which 
protocols are and aren’t allowed on a network and simply adapt their approach to compensate 
for the restrictions. This is yet another area where anomaly detection implementations could 
provide an observable benefit. Based on typical network traffic, if an anomaly based intrusion 
detection system were to suddenly see a network inundated with an abnormal amount of FTP 
traffic, it would be a tip off that some form of protocol misidentification were occurring. An 
example of a network anomaly detection mechanism capable of providing such functionality 
exists, and has been presented in the form of a tool known as Spectrogram [14]. 
Spectrogram [14] is a network oriented anomaly detection system which operates in a 
passive state. This system, proposed by Song et al. [14], works as a filter that examines 
multitudes of web requests in an attempt to find a small subset of attack traffic. Spectrogram 
operates at the packet layer so that it can easily be implemented in conjunction with a port-
mirror. By incorporating this functionality, the port-mirror is able to forward a copy of all 
received packets directly to Spectrogram, allowing for a system that does not add an additional 
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possible bottleneck to the receiver. The system operates by gathering packets, and analyzing 
them based on their content distribution and structure. Once packets have been picked out, 
they are passed through a system utilizing the machine learning algorithm known as Markov 
Chains, which afterwards requires some minor human interaction [14]. Unlike many of the 
other systems that were examined in this subsection [12] [17] [13], this system is not 
completely autonomous. After analysis, a final likelihood score for whether or not the anomaly 
is an attack is presented, and I.T. personnel can decide on a solution. 
While the primary focus of this work is to detect Side-Channel anomalies on a network, 
it is important to consider other implementations of anomaly detection systems. In doing so, 
the evaluation of these systems may provide a better understanding of the functionality 
required to develop a proper detection mechanism. Some of the other areas that were 
assessed include anomaly detection on mobile devices [22] and masquerade detection [23], 
both of which feature techniques that are oriented towards behavioural analysis. 
Threats against smartphones do not necessarily have to come in the form of malware, 
as the small size and transportability of these devices increases the risk of theft from simple 
eavesdropping techniques [22]. The limited functionality of these devices leaves their 
protection to rudimentary versions of security and authentication methods. Such features 
include pattern-based lock sequences, or simple 4-digit pin passcodes. Issues arise from this 
simplicity, as the limited functionality and vulnerable nature of these devices creates a 
challenge in preventing malicious access to a user’s device. A process outlined by Muslukhov et 
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al. [16] involves the use of a trusted process which operates in the background and monitors a 
user’s usage patterns. Once enough information has been obtained, a behavioural model of the 
user can be developed. Behaviour analysis allows for a detection mechanism to determine 
whether a particular action has been made by the user or a malicious party/software based on 
common patterns that a user may exhibit when interacting with their system or device. Should 
anomalous activity occur, a defensive action could trigger, such as a prompt for password 
authentication or a device lockdown. 
Another key area for anomaly detection is the prevention of masquerade attacks. 
Masquerade attacks are one of the most common types of malicious activity on both networks 
and computer systems [23]. A masquerade is a type of attack in which a malicious party has 
gained access to a system or network session and intends to impersonate a legitimate user for 
the purposes of accessing confidential information or to gain access to permissions that they 
have not been granted. These types of attacks can be incredibly difficult to detect since the 
malicious party is often using the credentials of a legitimate user, and is for all intents and 
purposes that user (as far as the system is concerned). 
A common method for the detection of these system masquerade attacks is to enlist the 
help of machine learning algorithms capable of classifying normal behavior and identifying 
suspicious activity. According to research presented by Salem et al. [23], an excellent way to 
determine if a masquerade is occurring on a computer system is to examine the search 
behaviour of the user. An average user will have fairly accurate knowledge of the layout of their 
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file system, thus when searching for a file, they will be able to do so in a limited fashion. It is the 
use of the search mechanisms in a Windows environment which plays an essential role in 
anomaly detection in the study presented by Salem et al. [23]. An extreme example of how 
search behaviour analysis could be effective is that a user will understand that photos of his 
family vacation would not be stored in his System32 folder, while a masquerading party or 
software may not. The result of such a lack of knowledge is a broader, more extensive search 
across the file system in a manner that is uncharacteristic of the typical user. 
In their paper, Salem et al. [23] modelled the usage behaviour of 18 individuals who 
were working with their own personal computers for a period of 4 days. The results were then 
compared against simulated data created from 40 additional users performing a mock 
masquerade on a system unfamiliar to them. The data gathered were run through an SVM 
based anomaly detection mechanism, and was able to provide a 100% detection rate with a 
false positive ratio of only 1.1% [23]. These results are within an acceptable range, but with the 
requirement of such a large sample size, it is difficult to determine if this would be feasible in a 
real-world scenario without extensive training performed by the user [15] [16]. 
 An additional area of anomaly detection which should be considered is the Support 
Vector Machine algorithm. Arguably the most successful classification method in machine 
learning, Support Vector Machines (or SVMs) are algorithms used to analyze data in order to 
recognize patterns and linear classifiers [24]. SVMs are a form of supervised learning, meaning 
that the details of the program are dependent on choices of parameters, which can be tuned by 
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the program given a set of objects of known classification [25]. In a lecture from the University 
of Caltech [24], Dr. Abu-Mostafa details the principled components of the method, which 
include finding the optimal margin, arriving at a solution analytically, and transforming the data 
nonlinearly; i.e., expanding the machinery to applicability with nonlinear data. These steps 
follow the approach developed by Cortes & Vapnuk [26] for binary classification in 1995, and 
are the characteristics of a program able to perform such tasks. 
The term linearly separable is used to describe data for which there exists a linear 
decision boundary that separates positive from negative examples [27]. Given such a two-class, 
separable training dataset, there are many possible separating lines and margins of error [24]. 
SVMs search for the best linear separator by looking for the decision surface that is maximally 
distanced from all data points [28]. As Dr. Abu-Mostafa explains [24], the process of generating 
data may result in noise, and the bigger the margin, the greater the chances that the new point 
will still be on the correct side of the line. In other words, maximizing the margin gives a 
classification safety margin, meaning that a slight error in measurement or documentation will 
not result in a miscalculation [28]. These points lying on the boundaries are called the support 
vectors, and our optimal separating hyperplane occurs in the middle of this margin [26]. 
Through examining related works, a few important details regarding anomaly detection 
have been discovered. Due to the lack of popularity in real-world environments, such 
mechanisms often face a multitude of challenges throughout the development process. A lack 
of available training data means that implementation would require a lengthy training process 
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on the part of the technician. This is especially evident when trying to develop a solution for a 
very specific or obscure problem, such as Side-Channel detection. Coupled with the inherently 
large amount of sample data and time required by some of the machine learning algorithms, it 
is arguable that anomaly detection mechanisms may not exist in a mature enough state to 
completely supersede conventional signature-based mechanisms. By utilizing the delta-CRC 
approach proposed by Chea [3], detection is transitioned into packet analysis (delta-CRC) rather 
than signal analysis (FER), meaning that detection may be possible without the use of machine 
learning algorithms. 
Many advantages to a variety of anomaly detection methods have been outlined above; 
however, these mechanisms are not perfect. Like all systems, anomaly detection mechanisms 
have a set of policies, which must be met in order for data to be determined anomalous.  
Engla et al. [21] suggest that should a malicious user develop an understanding of how an 
anomaly detection system operates through brute-force attempts to match the criteria, they 
could in theory trick a system into believing a user or message is legitimate. 
The functionalities of anomaly detection methods, and prior research in the field that 
have been presented herein, should be highly favourable when developing a Side-Channel 
detection system. In spite of all of the weaknesses that are presented above, it is important not 
to discount the potential benefits to using machine learning algorithms. For the scope of this 
thesis, several of the aforementioned algorithms will not be considered; however, SVM will be 
examined as a potential candidate in Section 5.5. The justification of such an algorithm’s 
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selection is primarily due to the fact that the Side-Channel problem is a binary decision, and 
SVM provides a distinct binary classification using linear separation. 
2.3 – Establishing a Side-Channel 
Najafizadeh [11] was able to establish a simulated Side-Channel communication in what was 
otherwise a rudimentary simulator application known as Sinalgo [29]. Using collected data from 
his Side-Channel simulations, he examined the ratio of corrupt to non-corrupted traffic during 
periods where Side-Channel existed, comparing them to those that had no Side-Channel. He 
was able to show that a system based on the network’s historical data would showcase a high 
degree of variance in the amount of Frame Error Rate (FER) when Side-Channel communication 
was occurring [11]. Using this, Najafizadeh [11]  proposed an agent-based detection system that 
would trigger an alert depending on whether or not the variance of FER fell outside of an upper 
bound. One of the limitations to his approach was a lack of exhaustive scenarios. 
Another approach to the detection of Side-Channel communication was presented 
through the use of the RTS/CTS network mechanic by Madtha et al. [2] The Request to Send / 
Clear to Send (RTS/CTS) mechanic is one employed on many wireless networks as an optional 
feature used to prevent information loss due to packet collisions. In a network using this 
feature, a sender node will transmit an RTS frame to check the availability of a channel prior to 
sending out a data packet. If the channel is available, the destination node will reply with a CTS 
frame, informing other nodes to refrain from transmitting any data for a period of time. As 
soon as the sender node receives the CTS message, it will begin transmitting data packets.  
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In the work of Madtha et al. [2], it was hypothesized that for every Side-Channel frame, 
there should be a corresponding RTS/CTS message pair. What this means is that while non-
malicious parties may be unable to determine whether or not a message has been purposely 
corrupted, analysis of the traffic should present a substantially higher number of RTS/CTS 
messages indicative of extra communication occurring on the network. For every RTS frame, 
there should be a corresponding data frame; this means that the ratio of received application 
data and RTS frames should be 1:1 in a network with no data loss. In the presence of Side-
Channel, this ratio will increase, and the amount of RTS messages will be significantly higher [2]. 
Several experiments were run using the QualNet [30] simulator, such as an increase in 
the number of nodes, a varied number of Side-Channel links, and a range of inter-nodal 
distances. In the results presented by Madtha et al. [2], a distinct increase in RTS messages was 
shown to be disproportionate to the amount of known data packets when a Side-Channel is 
present. Unfortunately, while this research provided promising results, several weaknesses 
were identified. In order for their method to work, a network is required to be running the 
RTS/CTS mechanic, which may not necessarily hold true for all networks. Additionally, this 
method is incredibly sensitive to Frame Error Rate, and in networks with a high degree of FER, 
there will be substantially more RTS messages as packets become naturally corrupted and 
require re-transmission, effectively skewing the results. The research presented Madtha et al. 
[2] demonstrated a need for an FER insensitive metric.  
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2.4 – Hamming Distance Delta-CRC 
In a wireless network, corrupted packets are typically detected through the use of a Frame 
Check Sequence (FCS). Frame Check Sequences work by appending a fixed-length binary 
sequence to the FCS field in the frame. This sequence is calculated by the source node based on 
the data within the frame. Figure 2.1 showcases several of the expected fields on a typical 
frame, including the FCS field. Other key fields which are present in a frame are the Preamble, 
SFD, Source/Destination Addresses, EtherType, and Payload. The Preamble contains a 56-bit 
binary pattern, which allows network devices to synchronize their receiver clocks. An SFD is 
used to signify the end of the preamble, and the beginning of the frame. Source and 
Destination fields contain the MAC addresses of both nodes, and allow nodes on a network to 
determine if a frame is meant for them. The EtherType field is two octets long, and often 
provides information regarding the length of a Payload. The frame’s Payload is where the actual 
data is stored, and can have a size between 42 and 1500 octets in length.  
Upon receiving a frame, the destination node recalculates the FCS sequence and 
compares it with the one included with the frame. If these values do not match, the frame is 
considered corrupt, and the node may request retransmission or drop the frame. The most 
common type of Frame Check Sequence is Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC). This CRC value is 
calculated by considering the result of the remainder when dividing the polynomial for the data 
payload by the CRC polynomial. Prior to this calculation, both of the polynomials are converted 
to their binary form. 
 
Moore | 23  
 
 
Figure 2.1 – A diagram of a standard frame w/ included FCS field. 
After a CRC value has been calculated, it is appended to the FCS field and the frame may 
then be transmitted. There is not just one standard CRC polynomial, but rather a set of 
standardized polynomials as defined by the IETF [31], ITU [32], and other similar organizations 
[33]. In fact, there are over 72 possible standard CRC polynomials [34], which range from CRC-3 
bits up to CRC-82 bits. It is also worth noting that while the CRC calculation does assist with the 
detection of transmission errors, it is entirely possible that certain bits may corrupt in such a 
way that a receiver may still calculate a CRC identical to the one that was sent [35]. In the work 
conducted by Koopman and Chakravarty [35], it is stated that a given CRC polynomial may 
operate more or less effectively on any given application. This means that a range of CRCs are 
necessary in order to facilitate a variety of operations, and the effectiveness of each is 
measurable. 
Further work by Koopman [34] explores the effectiveness of many well-known CRC 
polynomials, and classifies each based on their effectiveness and ideal payload size. The work 
presented demonstrates that a 32-bit CRC polynomial, commonly known as the “Koopman 
Polynomial”, provides the best error detection out of any of the standardised CRC calculations 
at the time. In his research, Chea [3] utilized this 32-bit CRC polynomial as a stand-in for the 
Side-Channel communication CRC in his experiments on HD as a metric for detection. Chea’s [3] 
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justifications were in part due to the fact that the 32-bit CRC polynomial is so widely used, and 
has a high effectiveness in error detection. As such, this is the CRC calculation that has been 
used for the experiments described herein; however, testing against a less effective CRC 
polynomial, while outside of the scope of this research, could provide further verification on 
the effectiveness of HD as a metric for Side-Channel detection. 
Throughout this work, the term “Hamming Distance” or “HD” refers to the number of 
bits that differ between an expected calculated CRC value and the actual value calculated by 
the recipient node. HD is a mathematical concept that was introduced by Richard Hamming in 
1950 [36], and is commonly used today in coding theory when comparing the difference 
between bit strings of equal length [37]. The HD value refers to the number of characters in 
given positions for which corresponding items are different, or the number of characters that 
must be changed in order for two items to match. In summary, it is a numeric representation 
for how different two same-length strings are. Consider the following examples demonstrating 
the HD between two similar, but different strings: 
“CAT” & “CAR” have an HD of 1 
“Brigette” & “Brittany” have an HD of 5 
Figure 2.2 – A simple demonstration of the HD between simple ASCII strings. 
This measurement can also be used to determine a difference in CRC values by examining 
them in their binary notation. When dealing with binary strings, the HD is equal to the number 
of ones in an XOR between two strings of length n. An example of this has been provided using 
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the two CRC polynomials that will be utilized in this research in Table 2.1. First, the Default and 
Koopman 32-bit CRC polynomials must be converted to their binary notation, and then an XOR 
may be performed to get their HD. In Table 2.1 below, it is shown that there are 13 positions 
with an XOR binary value of 1, meaning that the expected HD between the Koopman and 
Default CRCs is 13. This, of course, does not mean that there will always be an HD value of 13, 
as there is a chance that natural corruption may occur on Normal and Side-Channel frames. This 
corruption may cause certain bits to flip, creating CRCs with a wide variety of HDs, as will be 
shown in Section 5.3.  
Default 
(0x04C11DB7) 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 
Koopman 
(0x741B8CD7) 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 
XOR 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Table 2.1 – An XOR to calculate the HD of the Default 32-bit CRC polynomial, and the Koopman 32-bit CRC polynomial 
 In order for HD to work as a metric, one must first make the assumption that the 
number of bits different in a naturally corrupted Normal frame from a Side-Channel frame will 
be large enough to provide a visible separation between the two. The concept for using HD as a 
metric for Side-Channel detection was originally proposed by Chea [3]. This metric was the 
inspiration for much of the experiment planning for this work, and provided a basis to draw 
from and expand upon. The methodology and results presented by Chea [3] provide a better 
understanding for the rationale of many of the procedures used below.  
 Chea [3] suggests that the average HD between two CRC values could be used to detect 
Side-Channel where the malicious party has used an alternative CRC polynomial to mask his/her 
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traffic. In his work, Chea [3] also compared the HD of several CRC polynomials, including the 
Default 32-bit CRC, Koopman 32-bit CRC and Castagnoli 32-bit CRC to find the mean HD 
between them. His preliminary research showed that there was a clearly defined difference 
between the mean HD of the expected Default CRC vs. Koopman, and Default vs. Castagnoli [3]. 
Chea’s [3] work also provides merit to the fact that it should be possible to adequately 
determine if a Side-Channel exists given the assumptions: 
1. The CRC polynomial used for Side-Channel communication will be a known polynomial, 
such as the Koopman 32-bit CRC 
2. The CRC chosen by the malicious user for Side-Channel CRC will be different enough 
from the Default CRC (i.e. not a CRC containing a single flipped bit difference from the 
Default) 
The experiments presented in this thesis utilize a Default 32-bit CRC polynomial for all 
Normal traffic, and the Koopman 32-bit CRC polynomial for Side-Channel traffic. Due to current 
hardware limitations, the ability to modify these CRC polynomials for the different channels in 
the experiments was not possible, and instead a MATLAB [38] script was used to alter the CRC 
of specific frames in post-processing. The process of modifying the CRC values will be covered 
more in-depth in Chapter 4. 
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2.5 – MANETs & OLSR 
Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks, or as they’re more colloquially known, “MANETs” are self-configuring 
wireless networks consisting of mobile devices. These networks often lack any defined 
infrastructure, and instead build a routing table on the fly (thus, Ad-Hoc). The routing table of a 
MANET often exists in a peer-to-peer (P2P) nature. Every device in a MANET can move 
independently and in any direction, which leads to a number of challenges, such as maintaining 
a routing table, and creating persistent connectivity [39]. In order for a MANET to operate 
successfully, each device must have the ability to continuously maintain a routing table in order 
to properly route traffic. Some protocols, such as OLSR, rely on using designated devices to 
keep all other nodes up to date on the available routes. MANETs are also known for their 
heterogeneity, meaning that these networks may contain multiple transceiver types, resulting 
in an even more complex topology. 
 There are several categorizations for MANETs, each with their own unique uses and 
purposes. Vehicle oriented MANETs (VANETs) [40] are typically used for inter-vehicular 
communication and communication from vehicles to roadside equipment. A more recent usage 
is that of Smart Phone Ad-Hoc Networks (SPANs) [41], which rely on hardware existing within 
current commercial smartphones in order to create P2P networks to communicate while 
circumventing typical carrier networks. Another core application for MANETs environments are 
military communication devices. The experiments shown in this thesis are meant to emulate a 
military-style MANET environment [42] using the OLSR routing protocol. This research could 
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also be applied to different non-military applications such as: Campus Networks, Smart Phone 
Networks, or other similar Ad-Hoc applications. 
 Optimized Link State Routing (OLSR) is a variation of the standard Link State Routing 
Protocol [43], whereby each node in the network will independently form a routing table by 
determining the best path to each destination node in the network. OLSR was intended to 
optimize link state algorithms for use on a wireless ad-hoc network, especially one featuring 
embedded devices, smartphones, or other similarly resource-limited devices. OLSR is an 
improvement upon standard Link State protocols in that each node selects a set of neighbor 
nodes known as “multipoint relays” (MPR). It is only these MPRs that forward control traffic, 
effectively reducing the number of transmissions required, and therefore the flood of control 
messages [44]. 
2.6 – Classification Quality Measures 
The F-Score method (also known as F1 score or F-measure) is commonly used in a variety of 
works for classification, such as: information retrieval, search measurements, document 
classification, and query classification [45]. This approach is often used when testing the 
effectiveness of a feature, such as the HD between two CRC values. Another area that makes 
use of the F-Score calculation is the evaluation of word segmentation or speech recognition. In 
their work, Sangwan et al. [46] relied on the use of the F-Score calculation when testing their 
keyword model for phone-based speech recognition. Using this calculation, they were able to 
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propose a new threshold estimation technique for the detection of keywords in conversational 
speech patterns.  
 The F-Score calculation, while useful in classification, is far from perfect in that it has 
issues determining an effective threshold when trying to detect multiple classes. Tao et al. [47] 
have identified some of the limitations of the F-Score approach in their work, and proposed a 
new method of calculating a weighted F-Score. The F-Score measurement has been shown to 
produce issues when there is inter-class overlapping or inconsistent features [47]. The 
suggested issues arise due to the fact that F-Score weighs all features equally, which may not be 
idea for certain experiment conditions. To combat this, Tao et al. suggest a technique useful for 
selecting the most effective features for classification by taking the average value of a feature in 
a dataset and comparing it against another feature on a per-feature basis. This ensures that the 
most accurate feature is selected for the given problem. Since the described Side-Channel 
detection method relies on just a single feature, any multi-class limitations of F-Score will not 
be an issue. The F-Score measurement is calculated based on the compounded harmonic mean 
of precision and recall. Further information regarding this calculation will be examined in 
Chapter 3.  
 Some problems require a more specialized approach, where Precision and Recall may 
not be considered equally weighted. Two other commonly used F-measures exist for this 
purpose, and are called the F2 and F0.5 measures. F2 places more weight into recall than 
precision, while the F0.5 measure is more heavily weighted towards precision. These alternative 
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“Fβ” measures were proposed by Van Rijsbergen [48] as a means for when users place “β times 
as much emphasis on recall as precision”. Other work conducted by Xie et al. [49] demonstrates 
a multi-feature variation on the F-Score approach, where each feature is further verified 
through the use of the SVM machine learning algorithm. The use of SVM for verification is 
harkened back to within this work (Section 5.5), as a means for determining the effectiveness of 
the HD metric. 
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Chapter 3 –Side-Channel Identification 
Based on an F-Score Quality Measure 
3.1 – The F-Score as a Hamming Distance Detection Quality Measure 
An HD threshold is a whole number at which the maximum number of Side-Channel messages 
are detected, while avoiding false alarms when naturally corrupted Normal messages have a 
non-zero HD. The difficulty when selecting a value is that if your threshold is too high you will 
easily miss large volumes of Side-Channel communication; alternatively, if the threshold is too 
low, you will end up with a large amount of false positives. There are several quality measures 
for this type of classification, but the primary measurement chosen for this threshold 
calculation is a concept known as F-Score. It is important to understand how this measurement 
works in order to recognize how effective the calculated threshold may be. 
 When classifying data the most common approach to verification is to assess the data 
against a trusted set of correctly identified results. In doing so, you are able to determine 
whether or not data has been flagged as True/False Positive, or True/False Negative. Two 
common quality measures exist, known as Precision and Recall, which take these classifications 
into consideration when determining the relevance of the classification. Precision focuses 
largely on what fraction of the results were relevant to the classifier, by taking the number of 
True Positives and dividing it by the total number of data points identified as Positive. 
 




(𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 + 𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠)
 
Recall is oriented towards determining how successful the classification was, and does 
so by dividing the number of True Positives over the number of data points which should have 
been classified as positive (True Positives & False Negatives). As such, this value is heavily 
impacted by the number of False Negative classifications.  
𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙 =
𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠
(𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 + 𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠)
 
 The following Table 3.1 should be used for reference in order to better understand the 
influence of each of the classifications when calculating a threshold value. These concepts are 
not just essential for understanding how F-Score calculates a threshold, but also pivotal in 
gauging a threshold based on an ROC curve, as shown in Section 5.4.  
Term Definition 
True Positive (TP) The classifier has correctly categorized a data point as Side-Channel 
communication.   
True Negative (TN) The classifier has correctly categorized a data point as Normal traffic. 
False Positive (FP) The classifier has incorrectly categorized a Normal traffic data point as 
Side-Channel communication. 
False Negative (FN) The classifier has incorrectly categorized a Side-Channel data point as 
Normal traffic. 
Precision How accurately the number of data points classified as Side-Channel 
was, when compared to the number of False Positives.  
Recall How accurately the number of data points classified as Side-Channel 
was, was when compared to the number of missed Side-Channel frames 
(flagged as False Negative). 
Table 3.1 – Definitions of calculations / classifications utilized when calculating an F-Score value. 
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Both Precision and Recall are compounded in order to calculate a composite value 
known as F-Score. F-Score utilizes the Harmonic Mean [50] of Precision and Recall in order to 
find the best possible combination, or in this case, the Optimal HD Threshold. F-Score is 
displayed as a value which falls between 0 and 1, where 0 is considered highly inaccurate and 1 
is considered perfectly accurate. F-Score can be calculated using the following formula:  




In the work presented by Chea [3], F-Score was used to define a threshold for 
experiments by selecting the threshold which presented the highest F-Score. This work builds 
upon this, but instead aims to present a precise range of thresholds that could be used to 
detect Side-Channel in a variety of situations. In order to calculate a threshold using F-Score, a 
dataset with known Positive and Negative samples must exist, along with some metric to test 
against a threshold value. Hamming Distance is used as the metric for this purpose.  
When using F-Score to calculate a threshold, the first step is to select a range of 
threshold values to test. Each of these thresholds are checked against the HD metric of a 
dataset in order to determine the number of TP, FP, TN, & FN. For example, given a possible 
threshold range of 1-30, the HD value for each individual frame must be checked against the 
specific threshold in order to classify data. Precision and Recall calculations are then performed 
using the TP, FP, and FN values in the formulas described above. Once Precision and Recall have 
been determined for each of the thresholds being examined (in this case 1-30), F-Score 
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calculations may commence. Finally, the threshold value with the largest F-Score is determined 
to be the optimal threshold for the given dataset. 
The two other variables that were considered for the purposes of selecting a Hamming 
Distance threshold were Accuracy and Specificity. Accuracy is the measurement of how close 
the measurement results are to the true value, and how reproducible these results are. While 
Accuracy appears to provide a solid value for determining a threshold, this value has been 
shown to operate poorly when dealing with inconsistent conditions, such as the 
disproportionate levels of Side-Channel with respect to normal traffic. Specificity is the 
percentage of correctly identified True Negatives. While this is also important to measure, this 
calculation ignores a decrease in the number of True Positives as the threshold increases in 
favour of a greater rate of True Negatives. 
3.2 – Testing the F-Score Threshold 
In Section 2.4 it was explained that the HD is calculated by performing an XOR on two 
CRC values. This HD provides a metric for anomaly detection, and F-Score provides a threshold. 
Knowing the total number of each frame type, along with the Hamming Distance values for all 
of the Normal & Side-Channel frames, allows a user to determine which threshold provides the 
most optimal detection. Determining whether or not a frame is flagged as Side-Channel is as 
simple as comparing the HD value to the threshold. For example, if an F-Score Optimal 
Threshold of 12 is selected, any frames with an HD value of 12 or greater would be considered 
Side-Channel whether or not they do in fact belong to Side-Channel communication. This makes 
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the selection of a threshold a delicate balance between the highest possible naturally corrupted 
Normal frame HD, and the lowest possible Side-Channel HD. 
The following Figure 3.1 presents results from a rudimentary proof-of-concept Side-
Channel experiment where Side-Channel was emulated through the use of FTP, and HTTP traffic 
was generated to represent Normal traffic in a 2-node scenario with 30% FER. The Hamming 
Distance was calculated for these frame types, where the Koopman 32-bit polynomial was used 
for Side-Channel CRC generation. As you can see, when frames become naturally corrupted 
their HD increases, and with an increased percentage of FER there is a larger volume of frames 
that could be incorrectly flagged as Side-Channel. Consider the scenario, and imagine a 
threshold of 12 is applied to it. The threshold would capture the eight Side-Channel frames with 
HD values in the 13 – 18 range, but unfortunately would also incorrectly identify eighteen 
naturally corrupted Normal frames that have an HD of 12 – 17. This demonstrates the challenge 
of determining a threshold, as selecting a value that is too high or low could result in inaccurate 
results.  
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 In order to exhibit how F-Score is used in this decision, observe a snippet of the results 
from the F-Score calculation performed on this dataset in Table 3.2. The Threshold value of 16 
is calculated as the best choice for this dataset due to the fact that it presents the highest F-
Score. While a threshold of 14 shows a larger amount of True Positives, the number of False 
Positives raises. This demonstrates the concept of finding a harmonic mean.  
Threshold True(+) False(+) True(-) False(-) Accuracy Sensitivity Specificity Precision F-Score 
14 7 13 1038 2 0.9858 0.7778 0.9876 0.3500 0.4828 
15 6 4 1038 3 0.9933 0.6667 0.9962 0.6000 0.6316 
16 6 2 1038 3 0.9952 0.6667 0.9981 0.7500 0.7059 
17 4 1 1038 5 0.9943 0.4444 0.9990 0.8000 0.5714 
Table 3.2 – F-Score Calculations on a dataset with 2-Nodes & 30% FER. 
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Chapter 4 – Experimental Design 
The goal of the experiments is to simulate a military foot soldier platoon’s ad-hoc 
communication; as such, the selected MANET protocol, the positioning of the nodes [51], and 
the communication methods have all been kept in line with potential real-world scenarios [52]. 
Further details will be outlined in the sections below. 
4.1 The Hybrid Experimental Environment 
There are two possible routes that could have been pursued when developing experiments for 
this problem. Option 1 involves conducting experiments in a real network using real data, with 
two challenges in doing so: Should it exist, hardware capable of establishing a Side-Channel 
must be used; and if not, then a method for emulating the behavior of Side-Channel must be 
clearly defined. Option 2 is to use a network simulator, which outputs files for processing or 
allows for modification of source code in order to implement desired functionalities. Due to the 
obscure nature of the Side-Channel problem, it was unlikely that network simulators would 
offer this functionality off the shelf. 
In his work, Najafizadeh [11] aimed to develop a system in which a Side-Channel link 
could be established. Previous works in the topic [6] [10] had shown that a form of Side-
Channel communication may be possible through modification of the FCS field. Taking the 
results of those works into account, Najafizadeh [11] tested these hypotheses. This work also 
outlined the issues related to many of the simulator options, and described an exhaustive 
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search for compatible hardware. The Sinalgo [29] network simulator was chosen as the medium 
for simulation. Sinalgo [29] is an open source Java-based network simulator which provided 
core functionality necessary for simulation, and allowed for easier modification than other 
simulators such as NS-2 [53] or QualNet [11]. The elegant simplicity of Sinalgo left many 
features to be desired that would need to be added by Najafizadeh [11] before he could begin 
testing his hypothesis. One of the limitations of Sinalgo that was recognized in his  
work [11] was the fact that corrupted frames were simply discarded by the simulator, rather 
than being transmitted to the recipient. In addition to this, several other issues which he would 
later resolve were lack of a proper channel fading model, and a need for promiscuous agent 
nodes who could monitor and capture traffic. 
With little to no available hardware for Side-Channel testing, the most likely option for 
experimentation was to use a simulation environment. Simulators provide an inexpensive, 
scalable solution for testing, and typically allow for easily modifiable parameters. Network 
simulators in particular also often provide channel models, routing, and full TCP stacks. With 
support for the OLSR protocol, the ability to instantiate controlled mobility, and featuring a full 
TCP/IP protocol stack, QualNet [30] appears to be the ideal Simulator for Side-Channel 
experiments. Unfortunately, there are several issues when attempting to post-process or 
analyze data from QualNet scenarios, as frames generated within experiments are actually 
devoid of any useable information, such as FCS values.  
 
Moore | 39  
 
 One of the challenges facing the development of Side-Channel experiments is a distinct 
lack of hardware with the capability of establishing a genuine Side-Channel. Due to this 
limitation, performing experiments through simulation seems to be the most logical step; 
however, these simulators often lack the necessary functionality when it comes to transferring 
an actual data frame, as well as calculation and transmission of corrupt frames. Instead, a way 
to emulate this behavior is needed. In order to establish Side-Channel via the methods 
proposed in the previous works of Szczypiorski [6] or Najafizadeh [11], it must be possible to 
allow an application to generate its own FCS, which, as with all MAC layer operations, is a 
functionality that is locked into the firmware of most current 802.11 wireless network cards.  
A chipset known as the Atheros AR5212 developed by Qualcomm [55] supports a 
flexible MAC layer allowing for modification of the device’s CRC algorithm. Unfortunately, 
devices with this chipset are no longer in production, and have become scarcely available. 
Without the ability to generate an alternative CRC using hardware, a substitute method for 
emulating Side-Channel communication is necessary. The emulated Side-Channel must also be 
easily recognizable during the analysis phase in order to allow for modification in post-
processing. The simplest way to execute this is to establish a Constant Bitrate (CBR) 
communication on a port that differs from the rest of the network traffic. 
Chea [3] attempted to modify and recompile the source code for QualNet in order to 
implement FCS capabilities and frame information, but was unsuccessful in his efforts. His 
hypothesis was attempted in the QualNet simulator, tested using MATLAB with Simulink, and 
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finally accomplished with hardware using an emulated Side-Channel [3]. The QualNet [30] 
simulator was considered, but presented a lot of challenges regarding the implementation of a 
payload and CRC calculation. When unable to correctly analyze scenario information from 
QualNet, Chea [3] experimented with hardware environments, using FTP as an emulated Side-
Channel. This allowed for the ability to conduct detection on a network without needing the 
proper hardware required to modify the FCS field. The network described for this work was 
similar to that of a hub-and-spoke, with five nodes communicating to a central “Server” node 
and an agent node collecting data. Chea was able to show that there was a distinction between 
Hamming Distances of Side-Channel and non-SC nodes, with very simple experimental 
procedures. He developed a system known as the “Hybrid Testing Approach” [3] where results 
from a Wireshark [54] capture file were manipulated using MATLAB [38] to generate CRCs and 
FER. This “Hybrid” approach was borrowed for the processing and preparation of data for this 
thesis. Building from that, the work within this thesis aims to expand upon and improve much 
of what was shown in [3], while bringing it to a MANET environment. 
The Hybrid Experimental Environment involves parsing files captured from Wireshark, 
and executing a number of functions in MATLAB to organize the data into a format that can be 
correctly analysed. After six files created through the TShark scripts and Java program have 
been generated, the format of which are described in Section 4.5, a MATLAB script (see 
Appendix A) takes them as input. MATLAB/Simulink are the tools responsible for the actual CRC 
modification that constitute the emulated Side-Channel. With the frames parsed through 
TShark and Java, several output files have been created, but these files are simply the first step 
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towards collecting the data into a format that can be analyzed. As mentioned above, a different 
CRC polynomial is used for the purpose of Side-Channel than that of Normal traffic. Figure 4.1 
illustrates the process interactions between MATLAB and the parse files described above. The 
“olsrFCSCheck.txt” file is used by MATLAB in conjunction with the “hexDataDump.txt” file in 
order to identify which of the frames are good and which are naturally corrupted. Any naturally 
corrupted frames are automatically discarded to prevent skewing of the FER generation 
process. Next, the “olsrPorts.txt” file is used to determine if the received frame was destined 
for Port 1337, or another port. This is done to determine if the frames should be treated as 
Side-Channel or Normal traffic. Control frames and port 80 destined data frames are considered 
“Normal” traffic. Once a frame’s port, and corresponding type have been identified, they are 
forwarded to a decision gate and on to the CRC generation algorithm. If the frame was destined 
for Port 1337, a CRC is generated using the Koopman CRC polynomial (simulated Side-Channel) 
while all other frames compute a CRC based on a Default 32-bit CRC polynomial. At this point in 
the simulation process, each of these frames are treated as uncorrupted, and the Normal 
frames would be shown to have a HD value of 0 if compared to the expected polynomial. 
Once the appropriate CRC is generated for each frame, it is appended onto the end and 
simulation of channel properties can begin. The probability of each frame being erroneous is 
considered, and if it is selected to be so, a number of bits is flipped. The frame is given a chance 
to become corrupted based on the probability value inputted into the “Frame Error Probability 
Decider” function, and if it is not corrupted then it is sent on to have its HD calculated. If the 
frame is selected to become corrupted, it is passed through an “AWGN” channel for corruption. 
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The SNR value for this channel comes from the “SINRFile.txt” that was generated earlier. After 
corruption is complete, the corrupted frames are also sent on to have their HD calculated. 
In the final portion of the MATLAB script, the original Default polynomial is compared 
against the CRC of the current frame. From this, the HD value is calculated through an XOR of 
the two polynomials. If the HD value is 0, the frame is a non-corrupted Normal frame; 
otherwise, if there is an HD value that is greater than 0, the frame is either part of the Side-
Channel communication or a corrupted Normal frame. The HD value will always be a positive 
integer relative to the number of bits different it is from the expected CRC.  The HD value for 
each frame is then reported and output to a file. In addition to this, several values are 
calculated and output to files at this point, such as: frame count statistics and F-Score 
calculations (True Positives, False Positives, True Negatives, False Negatives, accuracy, 
sensitivity) for a range of thresholds (1 – 30). 
While this system allows for the emulation of a physical Side-Channel network, it does 
have a few limitations that must be addressed. Firstly, in order to increase the number of nodes 
in the experiment, one must re-run the physical experiments with an additional node. Secondly, 
the errors generated for each of the frames chosen for corruption are based on the AWGN 
channel model, and may only be as good as the channel model. This means that there may be 
some bias in regards to the accuracy of the Hamming Distances generated for corrupted 
frames. 
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4.2 – Platooning: Forging a Formation 
Platoon formations define the expected arrangements of soldiers in relation to each other. The 
goal of these formations is to provide as much flexibility to adapt to situations as needed while 
maintaining control of a unit. In almost all formations, Team and Squad Leaders are in the front, 
allowing for these individuals to lead by example, and as such all soldiers within a platoon are 
required to have line of sight on their leader at all times. The platoon formation is typically 
selected by a leader after he or she has considered factors such as Mission objectives, Enemy, 
Terrain, Troops, and Time available (METT-T) [52]. The selection of this formation should ideally 
provide maximum protection, and allow for the maintenance of unit cohesion, stable 
momentum, and a smooth transition between offensive and defensive actions. 
In an attempt to design experiments that represent military platoon scenarios as 
accurately as possible, several sources were examined when considering node placement. The 
“Fire Team Wedge” formation [52] is the most basic formation a fire team can select. This 
formation provides the unit with visibility of the Team Leaders, while covering a large patrol 
area. The interval between soldiers in this formation is suggested to be 10 meters, however this 
inter-operative distance is variable depending on visibility, terrain conditions, availability of 
space, or other factors affecting the functionality of the wedge. The inter-operative distance 
may shrink or expand in order to ensure visibility of the squad leader. According to the FM 7-8 
Infantry and Platoon Field Manual [52], it is not uncommon for a wedge to contract to the point 
where units may move in single file, if for example the platoon has entered into an indoor 
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environment. Figure 4.2 has been provided for reference of a standard Fire Team Wedge. The 
flexibility of the inter-operative spacing allowed for some modification to the platoon 
positioning in the experiments. Due to spatial limitations, and given that volunteers did not 
have radios for communication, inter-operative positioning was reduced to a standard distance 
of 5 feet. 
 
Figure 4.2 – The Fire Team Wedge, a standard platoon formation [52]. 
Both the number of soldiers and layout of the Fire Team Wedge were selected as 
parameters for the experiment. Not only did this formation provide a more realistic approach 
to node positioning, it also allowed for maximum control while directing volunteers. Based on 
the requirements of the experiments, and because the volunteers were not military trained, the 
Fire Team Wedge was selected both for simplicity, and to represent possible positioning during 
a standard patrol mission. 
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4.3 – The OLSR Routing Protocol 
For the experiments, a stable version of the OLSR protocol (0.6.8) was installed and run on the 
wlan0 interface using Ubuntu 14.04. Figure 4.3 shows a screen capture of OLSR’s output from a 
laptop with the IP Address 10.10.10.15. A similar output was printed to the terminal by OLSR on 
a per second basis as the routing table information was requested; however, the frequency of 
this update is configurable and can be increased or decreased as needed. In this capture, the 
links of each of the nodes on the network are present, along with their Link Quality (LQ) and 
Expected Transmission Count (ETX). Following this, the nodes which are considered direct one-
hop neighbours to each node, and whether or not they are MPRs, are also observable. Finally, 
the list of neighbours that are accessible through two-hops are listed, along with their total cost 
and prospective routes. 
Each of the nodes in the scenarios were provided with a static IP Address belonging to 
the 10.10.10.0/24 network. By providing static IP Addresses, analyzing captured data was 
easier, and allowed for a clear overview of the network activities in the live feed displayed in 
Wireshark [54]. 
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Figure 4.3 – A screen capture of the Ubuntu terminal showcasing the OLSR routing table output. 
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4.4 – Physical Experimental Scenarios 
In each of the experiment scenarios, the nodes formed a typical platoon of 8 members as 
defined by the Michigan Tech AROTC [51]. Squad members consisted of UOIT and Durham 
College volunteers, all of whom were informed of their right to withdraw, and their required 
tasks for the experiment, all of which was approved by UOIT’s Review Ethics Board (REB). A 
marker was used to signify an Observation Post that the squad needed to reach within the 
allotted five minute experiment scenario. During the experiment, volunteers were instructed to 
maintain a relative distance of 5 feet while walking. This distance was not arbitrarily chosen, 
but rather a scaled down variation of the standard 10m inter-operative patrol distance, as per 
the guidelines outlined in the sourced platoon field manuals [51] [52]. The key observation of 
this experiment was to monitor the relative effectiveness of the CRC HD metric in a MANET 
environment while subjected to normal interference. As such, participants in the experiments 
were merely a means of transporting devices in order to provide mobility, and as such no bias 
was made in regards to volunteers. 
Seven of the volunteers were responsible for carrying seven of the platoon nodes, and 
one volunteer was responsible for both the eighth node and the agent node. The arrangement 
of this was to illustrate that the agent could exist as a module within one of the nodes. Figure 
4.4 showcases the positioning and location of nodes for various times throughout the scenario. 
The hardware for each of the nodes was a Lenovo T520 laptop, with a second generation i5 CPU 
and 8GB of RAM. Each of the devices were configured using the Ubuntu 14.04 [56] operating 
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system, with the OLSR routing protocol installed. Ubuntu was chosen due to the fact that at the 
time of writing, there is currently no implementation of OLSR for non-Linux operating systems. 
The agent node was also a Lenovo T520 with the same hardware listed above; however, this 
device was running Windows 7, the Wireshark traffic analysis tool, and a USB network capture 
card. Volunteers maintained a constant walking speed and relative distance while following the 
predetermined route. It is also worth noting that due to the proximity of these devices, there 
was a full overlap, and all nodes could reach one another. The experiments were performed 
outdoors during overcast weather conditions with some light rain. Proof of concept 
experiments that were performed on similar conditions were also performed in an indoor 
setting and upon comparison, similar results were achieved within an FER percentage of 0.2%. 
Figure 4.4 – A topology diagram detailing the communication and positioning for the OLSR Experiment. 
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 In the experiments conducted by Madtha et al. [2] using the QualNet simulator, a 
Constant Bitrate (CBR) application was utilized for traffic generation. Drawing from this, it was 
discovered that an application known as “Nping” [57] provided desirable functionality for the 
experiments. Nping is an open source network packet generation tool that is commonly used in 
networks for measuring response times, detecting active hosts, and can even be used to 
generate raw packets for stress testing, ARP poisoning, or Denial of Service attacks. The Nping 
tool is versatile, and provides the ability to control the rate of transmission, number of packets 
sent, and destination port. This tool was chosen for the experiment since it would allow for raw 
packets to be transmitted across distinct ports. For the experiments, Side-Channel traffic was 
transmitted across port 1337, while “Normal” traffic was sent through port 80. In the 
experiment scenarios that were run, the rate of Side-Channel transmission was varied in order 
to test the HD detection technique against different ratios of Side-Channel to normal traffic 
communication.  
Each of the packets generated by Nping were 86 bytes, a relatively small size chosen in 
order to illustrate that the proposed technique could be used in even the most minimal traffic. 
Communication existed between multiple source and destination nodes, in order to generate as 
much traffic as possible while mitigating possible hardware bottlenecks when nodes were 
transmitting and receiving at the same time, and was sent using UDP. Figure 4.5 shows the 
communication links and the direction of transmission between each of the nodes in the 
platoon, where the blue links represent the traffic sent via port 80, and the red link represents 
the Side-Channel communication transmitted via port 1337. The agent node was not included 
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in the OLSR network, but instead simply captured nearby traffic in a promiscuous state using 
Wireshark [54] and the AirPCap TX [58] network capture card. 
The direction of communication for these experiments consisted of nodes 10.10.10.10, 
10.10.10.11, and 10.10.10.16 transmitting Normal traffic to the nodes ending in 14, 12 & 15 
respectively, while the malicious node 13 was responsible for transmitting Side-Channel traffic 
to 17. For reference, the Team Leader position is represented by nodes 10 & 14, the Grenadiers 
are 11 & 15, the Automatic Riflemen are 12 & 16, and the Riflemen are 13 & 17. 
 
Figure 4.5 – Demonstration of the communication links between the Side-Channel and normal traffic. 
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 Two parameters were varied for the experiments: the ratio of Side-Channel to normal 
communication, and the percentage of Frame Error Rate. While the ratio of  
Side-Channel to Normal traffic required running an additional experiment with each increase in 
volume, the modification to the percentage of FER was achievable offline in post-processing. 
During each of the five-minute experiments, Side-Channel communication would begin at the 
one minute and thirty second mark, and continue for ninety seconds. The experiments were 
run a total of 12 times, with the number of Side-Channel messages per second increased by an 
additional message each time in order to provide varying ratios of Side-Channel to normal 
traffic. The range of Side-Channel to normal traffic began with 9% of the total traffic as side 
channel, corresponding to one Side-Channel frame per second being transmitted over a 90 
second window. The percentage was increased by gradually adding an additional Side-Channel 
frame per second, until 40% of the traffic consisted of Side-Channel frames. The conclusion of 
experiments at 40% Side-Channel was not an arbitrary choice, but as will be shown in Chapter 
5, an observable threshold plateau began to appear. The scenarios consisted of the following 
percentages of Side-Channel traffic: 9%, 12%, 14%, 19%, 22%, 25%, 28%, 30%, 35%, 37%, and 
40%. These percentages correlated directly to an additional 1 Side-Channel frame per second. 
Adding or subtracting nodes from the network would of course directly increase/decrease the 
percentage of Side-Channel traffic relative to the change in normal traffic, and is a variable 
which could be examined in future experiments. 
As previously mentioned, there was a second controlled variable: the modification of 
the Frame Error Rate. Modification of this value was performed during post-processing through 
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the use of MATLAB and Simulink, where a select percentage of communication was artificially 
corrupted in order to increase the amount of noise. FER was modified in order to examine the 
effectiveness of the Hamming Distance metric for various levels of noise on the network. With 
increased error rate, the number of non-Side-Channel frames featuring higher than expected 
HD should be exponentially higher than instances with little to no noise. Through post-
processing, 22 different levels of FER were introduced to each of the 12 experiments, creating 
264 unique datasets for analysis. More information regarding the process of FER modification is 
shown in Section 4.5. 
4.5 – Pre-processing the Data 
With the data from the experiments captured and stored within a Wireshark file, it was 
important to parse it properly. All of the relevant data needed to be kept, while traffic not 
belonging to the OLSR network had to be stripped out and ignored. Due to the nature of 
monitoring wireless traffic, there are often a lot of packets captured which may belong to other 
networks within range. Fortunately, as part of its standard installation Wireshark includes a 
command line interface known as TShark. TShark allows a user to capture information similarly 
to Wireshark, but without a GUI. This tool also allows for the output of select frames and 
information from a capture file into a text file based on user-defined filter criteria. Several of 
the commands used for the filtering of traffic can be seen below in Figure 4.6. 
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Figure 4.6 – TShark Filter commands used in the generation of files. 
The five commands above, while all appearing nearly identical, actually provide a variety 
of information. The first command outputs a file called “allFCSCheck.txt”, which contains a 
binary list defining whether or not each of the frames captured suffered from natural error. 
This initial list is for all frames received, whether or not they were related to OLSR or the 
experiment. If a frame was corrupted, a value of 0 will be displayed for that particular frame. It 
is important to note that each of the output files generated will feature the frames in the order 
that they were received by the AirPCap device. The second command generates a file similar to 
that of command 1, with the exception that it filters out and displays only frames which have 
been transmitted using UDP with a destination of port 1337 or port 80, or if they were simply 
using the OLSR routing protocol. These filters allowed for the capture of all OLSR control 
packets, Side-Channel packets, and generated “Normal” traffic in the experiment. The third 
command also filters frames using the same criteria, but this time outputs a file titled 
“olsrPorts.txt”, containing the port values of all of the frames relevant to the experiment for the 
1) tshark -r "captureFile.pcapng" -T fields -e wlan.fcs_good >> 
allFCSCheck.txt   
 
2) tshark -Y "udp.port==1337 || udp.port==80 || olsr" -r "captureFile.pcapng" 
-T fields -e wlan.fcs_good >> olsrFCSCheck.txt 
 
3) tshark -Y "udp.port==1337 || udp.port==80 || olsr" -r "captureFile.pcapng" 
-T fields -e udp.dstport >> olsrPorts.txt 
 
4) tshark -Y "udp.port==1337 || udp.port==80 || olsr" -r "captureFile.pcapng" 
-T fields -e radiotap.db_antsignal >> SINRFile.txt 
 
5) tshark -Y "udp.port==1337 || udp.port==80 || olsr" -r "captureFile.pcapng" 
-x >> hexDataDump.txt 
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OLSR network. The fourth command generates the “SINRFile.txt” file, containing the Wireshark 
calculated Signal-to-Noise ratio for each captured frame. Finally, command 5 generates a file 
containing the data bytes captured by Wireshark in their hexadecimal format. 
With the data of the captured frames output to a file, it is then necessary to convert 
them from Hexadecimal into a format that can be analyzed. Using a java program originally 
created by Chea [3], the dumped hexadecimal data was serialized into a binary format and 
output to a file for use by MATLAB. Figure 4.7 shows an example of the type of conversion 
performed on a frame by the program. On the left are the Wireshark bytes in their hexadecimal 
format. These bytes represent the frame’s fields and data. To better evaluate what is provided 
in this data, it is important to recognize what is present in this text. The first column containing 
clusters of four digits is used to signify the position of each line within the hex dump. The start 
of each new frame is clearly defined by Wireshark through the use of the value “0000”. The 
middle values, shown in clusters of two hexadecimal digits, contain the actual data portion of 
the frames. Lastly, the rightmost column is an ASCII translation of the hexadecimal numbers 
within the frame. For the purposes of the Java program, only the first two columns are 
considered. The program captures each line of hexadecimal and then converts it into a binary 
sequence, appending the lines together in order to form a single binary sequence for each 
frame, removing the bits correlating to the FCS field. These bits are removed so that a new CRC 
may be incorporated into them using MATLAB. After all of the frames have been assessed by 
the program, a text output file is generated, and MATLAB post-processing may begin. Figure 
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4.8, presents a process diagram of the entire parsing process from start to finish. The 
significance of each of these files has been detailed in-depth in Section 4.1. 
 
Figure 4.7 – An example output of Chea’s [3] TShark hex dump Java program. 
 
 
Figure 4.8 – Process diagram illustrating the steps involved in parsing Wireshark capture files for MATLAB. 
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Chapter 5 – Analysis 
The goal of this analysis chapter is to determine whether or not it is possible to define a 
threshold, or range of thresholds that will detect Side-Channel communication with as few false 
negatives or false positives as possible in a MANET. Another important task is to compare the 
results presented by Chea [3] against the MANET results, to determine whether his stationary 
network could utilize the same threshold range presented below. 
5.1 – Performing the F-Score Calculation 
Using F-Score for calculation, threshold values from 1 – 30 were tested for each of the 
experiment scenarios, with the value presenting the highest F-Score value ultimately being 
chosen as the threshold as presented in Section 3.2. The following information presented in 
Table 5.1 shows the statistical information for a scenario with 14% of the total traffic consisting 
of Side-Channel communication, and using the actual (unmodified by MATLAB) calculated FER. 
Percentage of Frame Error Rate: 0.83% 
Total Number of Frames: 2,680 
Total Number of Uncorrupted Frames: 2663 
Total Number of Naturally Corrupted Frames: 17 
Total Number of Non-SC (Normal) Frames: 2316 
Total Number of Side-Channel Frames: 364 (14%) 
Table 5.1 – Statistical information regarding the 14% SC scenario using its unmodified 0.83% FER 
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The process of calculating F-Score was described in-depth in the above Chapter 3, and as 
such will not be re-examined here. Instead, observe the results of the F-Score calculations for 
proposed threshold values from 1 – 30 in Table 5.2. With an F-Score value of 0.9973 (on a scale 
from 0 – 1), the threshold of 9 was selected in this scenario. Upon further examination of the  
F-Score results, it is evident that while a threshold value of 9 did not have the highest number 
of True Positives, it did in fact have a lower number of False Negatives than some of the higher 
thresholds. A threshold of 10 or higher had even fewer False Positives, but began to present a 
larger number of False Negatives, continuing this trend as the threshold grew higher. This 
suggests that the F-Score Calculation places a higher level of significance to the best harmonic 
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Threshold True(+) False(+) True(-) False(-) Accuracy Sensitivity Specificity Precision F-Score 
1 364 14 2302 0 0.9948 1 0.994 0.963 0.9811 
2 364 14 2302 0 0.9948 1 0.994 0.963 0.9811 
3 364 14 2302 0 0.9948 1 0.994 0.963 0.9811 
4 364 12 2304 0 0.9955 1 0.9948 0.9681 0.9838 
5 364 11 2305 0 0.9959 1 0.9953 0.9707 0.9851 
6 364 8 2308 0 0.997 1 0.9965 0.9785 0.9891 
7 364 6 2310 0 0.9978 1 0.9974 0.9838 0.9918 
8 364 5 2311 0 0.9981 1 0.9978 0.9864 0.9932 
9 363 1 2315 1 0.9993 0.9973 0.9996 0.9973 0.9973 
10 361 0 2316 3 0.9989 0.9918 1 1 0.9959 
11 352 0 2316 12 0.9955 0.967 1 1 0.9832 
12 331 0 2316 33 0.9877 0.9093 1 1 0.9525 
13 310 0 2316 54 0.9799 0.8516 1 1 0.9199 
14 279 0 2316 85 0.9683 0.7665 1 1 0.8678 
15 223 0 2316 141 0.9474 0.6126 1 1 0.7598 
16 159 0 2316 205 0.9235 0.4368 1 1 0.608 
17 107 0 2316 257 0.9041 0.294 1 1 0.4544 
18 63 0 2316 301 0.8877 0.1731 1 1 0.2951 
19 35 0 2316 329 0.8772 0.0962 1 1 0.1754 
20 15 0 2316 349 0.8698 0.0412 1 1 0.0792 
21 5 0 2316 359 0.866 0.0137 1 1 0.0271 
22 2 0 2316 362 0.8649 0.0055 1 1 0.0109 
23 0 0 2316 364 0.8642 0.00 1.00 NaN NaN 
24 0 0 2316 364 0.8642 0.00 1.00 NaN NaN 
25 0 0 2316 364 0.8642 0.00 1.00 NaN NaN 
26 0 0 2316 364 0.8642 0.00 1.00 NaN NaN 
27 0 0 2316 364 0.8642 0.00 1.00 NaN NaN 
28 0 0 2316 364 0.8642 0.00 1.00 NaN NaN 
29 0 0 2316 364 0.8642 0.00 1.00 NaN NaN 
30 0 0 2316 364 0.8642 0.00 1.00 NaN NaN 
Table 5.2 – Demonstration of F-Score results used to select a threshold of 9 for the given scenario. 
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5.2 – Assessing a Threshold Range 
The F-Score calculation was tested against the data from 252 out of the total 264 experiments 
in order to determine the possibility of a potentially universal threshold, or range of thresholds 
that would allow for the detection of a Side-Channel in any network. The scenarios for an FER of 
0% were omitted for these calculations, as even though the experiments featured an incredibly 
low actual FER (0.4% - 0.8%), the likelihood of establishing communication with an absolutely 
0% FER can be considered virtually impossible.  Table 5.3 contains the calculated Optimal HD 
Thresholds for these experiments, where each column represents a different percentage of 
Side-Channel communication, and each row is the percentage of simulated FER. By graphing 
these calculated thresholds, such as in Figure 5.1 or Figure 5.2, it initially appears as though 
there is very little consistency in thresholds. As the percentage of FER increases, the threshold 
fluctuates seemingly at random. While there is some observable patterning in the HD, analyzing 
the data in this way provides what appears to be a range of thresholds from an HD value of 5 up 
to an HD value of 15. This spread of threshold ranges is far too large to be considered effective, 
and establishing a cohesive range of thresholds would be unreliable. Fortunately, there are 
ways to narrow down these threshold values into an acceptable range. 
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Figure 5.1 – A graph showing the calculated Optimal HD Threshold for each SC percentage where each line represents the percentage of FER. 
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While the huge variance in calculated thresholds makes determining a narrow range of 
thresholds appear to be quite difficult, further inspection of the data suggests that this is not 
actually the case. Observe Table 5.3, and notice that the mean, median and mode of these 
thresholds fall between 10 and 13, and begins to normalize after the percentage of Side-
Channel increases beyond 25%. Taking into consideration how HD operates, you cannot suggest 
that an HD value is not a whole number; you must round up or down (i.e. you cannot have an 
HD that is 11 ½ bits different from the expected CRC). By rounding these HD threshold means, a 
consistent range of thresholds with an average mean of 11 – 12 appears, all calculated with a 
substantially high typical F-Score hovering around 0.99.   
By calculating the Standard Deviation of the thresholds for each of the varying amounts 
of Side-Channel, it is possible to say with 95% and 99% confidence that the range of Optimal 
Thresholds still falls between the 11 – 12 range (with rounding), as shown in Figures 5.3 and 
5.4. In addition to this, as the percentage of Side-Channel communication increases past 19%, 
the mean threshold remains relatively consistent, with a maximum variance of 0.6. 
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  9% 12% 14% 19% 22% 25% 28% 30% 33% 35% 37% 40% 
0% FER 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Actual FER  9 7 9 8 6 8 7 7 7 6 6 5 
5% FER 11 11 10 10 10 9 9 10 9 9 9 9 
10% FER 11 11 11 10 10 10 10 10 9 10 10 10 
15% FER 12 11 11 11 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
20% FER 11 12 12 11 11 11 11 11 10 10 10 10 
25% FER 12 12 12 12 11 11 11 11 10 10 11 11 
30% FER 13 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 10 11 11 11 
35% FER 13 12 12 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 
40% FER 13 12 13 12 12 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 
45% FER 12 12 12 12 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 
50% FER 13 13 13 12 12 12 12 11 11 11 11 11 
55% FER 13 12 12 12 12 11 12 11 11 11 11 11 
60% FER 13 12 13 12 12 12 11 11 11 11 11 11 
65% FER 13 13 13 12 12 12 12 11 11 11 11 11 
70% FER 13 13 13 12 12 12 12 12 12 11 11 11 
75% FER 13 12 12 12 12 12 12 11 11 11 11 11 
80% FER 13 13 13 12 12 12 12 12 12 11 12 12 
85% FER 14 13 13 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 11 
90% FER 13 13 13 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
95% FER 13 13 13 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
100% FER 13 13 13 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 11 
             Mode 13 12 13 12 12 12 12 11 11 11 11 11 
Mean 12.4 12.0 12.1 11.4 11.2 11.1 11.1 11.0 10.7 10.7 10.8 10.6 
Median 13 12 12 12 12 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 
Variance 1.26 1.85 1.29 1.06 1.96 1.23 1.59 1.25 1.61 1.73 1.79 2.15 
SD 1.12 1.36 1.14 1.03 1.40 1.11 1.26 1.12 1.27 1.32 1.34 1.47 
Kurtosis 3.26 8.65 1.44 5.44 9.42 2.20 4.77 7.50 2.33 7.63 7.80 
11.3
6 
Skewness -1.69 -2.55 -1.33 -2.23 -2.79 -1.53 -2.01 -2.28 -1.34 -2.36 -2.43 -3.05 
95% C.I. 0.47 0.57 0.47 0.43 0.59 0.46 0.53 0.47 0.53 0.55 0.56 0.61 



















































Table 5.3 – Optimal HD Thresholds for all 264 unique experiment combinations. 
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Figure 5.3 – Mean HD thresholds shown to fall within the suggested 11 – 12 range, with 95% confidence. 
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5.3 – Using the Threshold to Find a Side-Channel 
Now that F-Score has been used to determine a threshold value, the results of the experiments 
must be tested against these thresholds. As was demonstrated in Section 5.1, the threshold 
calculation with the highest F-Score value should represent the most accurate value that avoids 
a large volume of False Positives and Negatives. By graphing the HD of each of the frames from 
one of the individual scenarios, it is possible to visually demonstrate how well these thresholds 
may actually perform when differentiating Side-Channel frames from normal traffic.  
 
Figure 5.5 – A visual representation of the HD values for all frames in a scenario with 14% Side-Channel traffic & 25% Frame Error Rate. 
As depicted in Figure 5.5 above, even with a higher volume of naturally corrupted 
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Channel frames and any naturally corrupted Normal Traffic. The question is, how accurate is 
this trend across multiple scenarios? If you take the mean of the HD for Side-Channel and 
Normal traffic from a population sample of all experiments featuring their actual FER 
percentages (Table 5.4), a distinct difference in these values is evident between traffic types. 
Using the suggested threshold range described above (11 – 12), one can see that this range fits 
nearly centered between the two HD mean trend lines in Figure 5.6.  
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By calculating the confidence level results at 95% and 99% confidence for each of the 
Normal and Side-Channel HDs, it can be stated that each of the HD means of Normal frames fall 
within the range of 8.0 +/-0.32 with 95% confidence, and 8.0 +/-0.42 with 99% confidence. 
Additionally, the population mean for Side-Channel frames falls within the range of 16.0 +/-0.54 
with a confidence level of 95%, and 16.0 +/- 0.70 with a confidence level of 99%. These results 
suggest that the appropriate threshold should exist somewhere between the calculated 
population means of the two values. To better interpret these results, please refer to Figures 
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Figure 5.7 – The HD population means for Normal and Side-Channel traffic at 99% confidence. 
Looking back at the proposed threshold range for the sum of the experiments (Figures 
5.3 & 5.4), it was stated with 95% and 99% confidence that the threshold would exist within a 
range of 11 – 12. This is well within the isolation of the population means shown above for all of 
the tested percentages of Side-Channel traffic.  
In his work, Chea [3] suggested that a threshold would exist in the range of 15 – 16, but 
the results shown above advocate that the threshold should in fact exist within the realm of 11 
– 12. This difference in threshold is expected; as shown in Table 5.3, variation in Side-Channel 
frames will effectively skew the position of the mean Optimal Threshold based on the 
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presented by Chea [3], the total percentage of Side-Channel traffic was roughly 1% for his 
experiments. This implies that the threshold directly correlates to the ratio of Side-Channel 
traffic for a given period, and provides further proof that a Windowing technique could allow 
for more precise threshold detection in real-time. With F-Score shown to be capable in its 
ability to define a threshold based on HD, it is important to ensure the validity of the HD metric 
itself. Section 5.4 & 5.5 respectively explore the use of the Receiver Operating Characteristic 
curve and the Support Vector Machine learning algorithm to determine if the HD metric is 
useful for classification, or if the F-Score calculation presents a biased level of effectiveness. 
5.4 – ROC Curves 
The Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve is a plot of the True Positive Rate (TPR) 
against the False Positive Rate (FPR) (1 – Specificity) for all possible thresholds of a diagnostic 
experiment. The technique provides information on how effective a given feature is for a 
particular set of data. The calculation for the TPR is the same as Sensitivity (also referred to as 
“Recall”), which has been shown in Section 3.1 as part of the F-Score calculation and assesses 
how positive a given threshold is for the technique. The TPR and FPR calculations rely on the 
count of True/False Positives and True/False Negatives for a given threshold tested against a 
dataset. The general purposes of an ROC curve are to provide the following [59]: 
1. Demonstrate a tradeoff between Sensitivity and Specificity, where increasing one 
decreases the other 
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2. The closer that the area under the ROC curve is to 1, the better the classifier is at 
detection 
3. The closer the curve droops to the central 45-degree diagonal of the graph (less area 
under the curve), the less accurate the threshold can be considered 
 Assessing a threshold technique using an ROC curve is relatively simple: the more a 
curve represents a 90-degree angle, the more optimal the test is for that particular dataset 
[59] [60]. A prediction method with the best possible outcome would yield a point at the 
upper leftmost corner of the ROC space, which represents 100% Sensitivity (no False 
Negatives) and 100% Specificity (no False Positives). If an arbitrary guess at classification is 
taken, then the ROC curve should appear as a point along a 45-degree diagonal line, also 
referred to as the “Line of No Discrimination.” Figure 5.8 illustrates this concept, where 
Point A represents a perfect classification, Point B represents a moderate classification, 
Point C represents a poor classification. Point D may also represent an exceptional 
classification, as a curve along this point would describe the presence of Normal traffic. In 
the case of F-Score thresholds, an ideal threshold should have a high TPR, whilst 
maintaining a low FPR. Not all data is equal, so a technique may be more or less effective 
for a particular dataset. Performing an analysis using ROC curves will demonstrate how 
effective the calculated HD thresholds are for a given Side-Channel experiment. 
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Figure 5.8 – Determining the effectiveness of a point in the ROC space [61]. 
 Figure 5.9 presents the ROC curves calculated for the HD thresholds on a variety of 
scenarios. These scenarios range from 9% to 25% Side-Channel, and from 0.8% (Actual FER) 
to 95% FER. This wide range of scenarios was arbitrarily chosen to demonstrate how 
effectively the HD metric can be used across a large variation in scenarios. As mentioned 
above, the closer the area under the curve approaches 1, the more effective the test is 
against a particular dataset. Figure 5.9 demonstrates just how effective thresholds based on 
HD are against the Side-Channel problem. 
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Figure 5.9 – The ROC curve demonstrating the effectiveness of the F-Score thresholds, with a magnified view of the upper left corner. 
 As shown above, this technique suggests that the F-Score approach to defining 
thresholds is very effective when tested against the HD metric. It should be noted that the 
ROC curve is strongly influenced by False Negatives, and as such the scenarios with lower 
FER (less naturally corrupted Normal frames) depict a much higher area under the curve. 
There are some similarities between the ROC & F-Score approaches in that they both rely 
on the use of Sensitivity & Specificity; while these techniques are assessed very differently, 
it is important to disprove any bias that may be caused by similar variables. In order to do 
so, Section 5.5 explores the use of the SVM machine learning algorithm as an alternative 
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5.5 – Support Vector Machines 
For the purposes of this thesis, SVM classification was performed using a tool known as 
SVMlight [62]. SVMlight is an implementation of the Support Vector Machine algorithm 
programmed in C. Created by Thorsten Joachims of Cornell University in 2008, this software 
was based on Vapnuk’s Support Vector Machine to solve the problem of pattern recognition, 
regression, and learning a ranking function. The tool itself requires compilation from the source 
code, and consists of two compiled modules: “svm_learn” for learning from a training set, and 
“svm_classify.” Svm_classify uses a model generated from the svm_learn module in order to 
classify a test dataset. These modules are used through the Terminal window (Linux/OSX) or 
the Command Prompt (Windows). Figure 5.8 shows a typical training/classification performed 
using the data from one of the scenarios.  
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Figure 5.10 – Performing SVM learning and Classification in the SVMlight tool. 
The svm_learn module takes in a space delimited input file containing training 
examples. The format of each of the lines in the training example should look similar to: 
<target> <feature>:<value> <feature>:<value> ... <feature>:<value> # <info> 
Where <target> is a value of +1 for a positive example, -1 for a negative example, or 0 
where the target will be treated as a negative example through transduction by default. A data 
entry can also have multiple features; for example, if characterizing a person, features could 
refer to traits such as: eye colour, hair colour, etc. For the purposes of this work, each data 
point (frame) has only one feature, since the only data that must be tested is the HD. Finally, 
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the value parameter is the actual digit to be checked against the SVM defined threshold, and in 
this example the HD was used as the value. It is also possible to force the tool to ignore a line, 
or provide additional information by commenting it out through the use of the # symbol. In 
order to correctly utilize SVMlight, the arrangement of the captured HD data had to be placed 
into the correct format (commonly known as “scaling”). An example of the formatting can be 
seen below: 
-1 1:0 #Normal 
+1 1:17 #Side-Channel 
The above example shows two lines taken directly from the training file used for 
analysis. Selecting feature numbers is a fairly straightforward process, where each item (in this 
case, a frame) is granted a feature based on some criteria such as weighted importance. Given 
that the Hamming Distance value is the only metric being used for classification in this analysis, 
each of the frames had a single feature, which was given a value of 1. 
For the SVM classification process a scenario with a moderate amount of Side-Channel 
was chosen, which for consistency, was the same experiment explored in Section 5.3. This 
experiment features 14% of the traffic as Side-Channel. In order to achieve the most optimal 
classification threshold, it is important to begin with a training set that demonstrates the 
cleanest separation between classes. As such, the training set was formed using a scenario with 
14% Side-Channel, but this time a version with an FER of just 0.83% was used. Selecting a 
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scenario with such a low FER percentage ensures a significantly lower count of naturally 
corrupted frames, and offers clear separation between the HDs of the Side-Channel and Normal 
traffic. Training was accomplished using a feature set containing all 2680 frames from the 
scenario. Upon completion of the training process using the training data created based on the 
HD values for this experiment, SVMlight generated a model file for classification that contained a 
threshold value. For this particular experiment, SVMlight defined the threshold as 11.4559, which 
further supports the proposed threshold range of 11 – 12.  
With training complete, classification using this model was performed on the 14%SC @ 
25%FER scenario. The additional FER means more naturally corrupted frames appear, and a 
larger volume of Normal frames with high HD values offers a greater chance of 
misclassification. As shown in Figure 5.5, there are a large number of corrupted Normal frames 
with HDs in the 5 – 12 range. 
SVM classifies items as positive or negative based on their value in relation to the 
defined threshold. Items that are classified as positive are assigned an SVM rank above zero, 
while negative items are assigned a value below zero. Figure 5.11 illustrates the predictions 
assigned by SVM for each of the frames, where the Y-axis represents the SVM prediction and 
the X-axis represents the Frame Number. Frames above 0 on the Y-axis have been classified as 
Side-Channel, while frames below 0 are classified as Normal traffic. For reference, the data 
points have been colour-coded based on their actual type. Frames with an SVM ranking above 0 
that were accurately classified as Side-Channel frames have been categorized as “True 
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Positive,” while Normal frames have been assigned a category of True Negative/False Positive 
depending on their SVM ranking. As the SVM rank increases or decreases, so does the 
likelihood that the value belongs to a certain class. For example, it is 100% likely that a frame 
with a ranking of -11 is a Normal frame, while a frame with a rank of +31 is most definitely a 
Side-Channel frame. 
 
 Figure 5.11 – SVM Classification of Side-Channel based on HDs of a scenario with 14% SC at 25% FER. 
 In Figure 5.12, the SVM classification has been graphed relative to the Hamming 
Distance of each frame. The calculated SVM threshold of 11 has also been included for 
reference. While SVM does incorrectly classify 57 data points as Side-Channel, it still manages 
to correctly classify 2623 of the total possible 2680 frames. The threshold shown through this 
SVM training (11.4559) is also conducive to the range of thresholds (11 – 12) defined using F-
Score in Section 5.2. This signifies that SVM could potentially provide a system in which a 
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Chapter 6 – Conclusion 
6.1 – Summary 
This thesis has presented the concept of Side-Channel communication through the modification 
of the CRC polynomials in a MANET environment, and attempted to provide the reader with a 
thorough understanding of its functionality and the issues involved in detection. In addition to 
this, several works related to this seemingly obscure problem have been explored, and their 
contributions and limitations have been assessed. Elements from these works were drawn from 
or considered when attempting to develop experiment scenarios that could accurately 
represent a real-world environment. The concepts of Cyclic Redundancy Checks and the HD 
metric were presented, along with the role that they play when trying to recognize the 
presence of Side-Channel.  
 The goal of this thesis was to take a military oriented MANETs environment that had 
fallen victim to Side-Channel communication and not only attempt to detect it, but also provide 
a range of threshold values that could work across a variety of situations. Information on 
Platooning was considered and 12 experiment scenarios came to life through the use of an  
8-man platoon of nodes operating over the OLSR routing protocol in a MANET. Communication 
took place through the use of the Nping software, where Side-Channel traffic was directed 
through a different port than normal traffic. An agent node running a USB AirPCap packet 
capture card, in conjunction with Wireshark, was able to intercept messages on the network for 
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analysis. Through artificially introducing varying levels of FER into the captured data with the 
help of MATLAB, 264 unique experiment combinations were built and ready for analysis. With 
no simulators capable of offering the ability to output frame contents, including header 
information, all of the experiments had to be completed in a hardware environment with an 
emulated Side-Channel. 
 The F-Score mechanic was used to calculate a threshold based on HD for each of these 
scenarios, and it was identified that a mean threshold range of 11 – 12 provided accurate 
detection capabilities consistently across each of the experiments. Calculating the Standard 
Deviation and Confidence Interval of the thresholds for each of the varying amounts of  
Side-Channel made it clear that with 95% and 99% confidence, the range of Optimal HD 
Thresholds fell well within the defined range. In an attempt to illustrate the difference between 
Side-Channel and Normal traffic, a population sample was taken from the experiments and it 
was shown once again with Standard Deviation that Normal traffic typically had with 95% 
confidence a mean HD of 8.0 +/-0.32, and with 99% confidence a mean of 8.0+/-0.42. 
Comparatively, the HD of Side-Channel traffic was shown to hover in the area of 16.0 +/-0.54 
(95%) & 16.0 +/- 0.70 (99%). Further validation of the F-Score thresholds was performed using 
ROC curves, which showed that the HD-based F-Score thresholds were incredibly accurate in 
this purpose. 
  To verify whether or not HD was a valid metric, and to ensure that F-Score was not 
biased, the Support Vector Machine algorithm was also considered, and was trained to 
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successfully classify Side-Channel based on HD as a feature. This evaluation was performed by 
taking an optimal dataset with little to no noise that featured 14% Side-Channel and training 
the SVM classifier. Once a model had been established, another scenario with 14% Side-
Channel was selected for classification, with the key difference being the 25% FER present in 
the scenario. Not only did the results show that the HD metric could be used for classification 
using alternative approaches, it also presented a threshold that fits perfectly into the range 
proposed using F-Score. 
While gathering the appropriate training information on a given network will help to 
accurately determine a threshold, the proposed range of 11 – 12 should provide an excellent 
starting point towards solving the issue of Side-Channel communication. Many of the 
techniques explored within this work have resulted in thresholds of similar values belonging to 
this range. 
6.2 – Future Work 
There are several areas that have been identified within this paper which could certainly 
benefit from additional research. Firstly, the experiments presented all share one similar 
characteristic in that the same CRC polynomials were used for Normal and Side-Channel 
frames. This makes the assumption that the Koopman 32-bit CRC would be chosen as the CRC 
polynomial for Side-Channel; however, there is no guarantee that the malicious party may 
utilize one of the standard CRC polynomials. Future work should be conducted through 
thorough experimentation on different standard and non-standard CRC polynomials. An 
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example of this would be to use a CRC with merely a single bit difference from the CRC used for 
Normal traffic and determine if our estimated threshold range would remain effective. In the 
work of Chea [3], it is suggested that there are a total of 22342 CRC combinations, and an 
exhaustive comparison of the HD metric against even a small subset of these could prove 
beneficial. 
 Another key area that was not explored in this thesis, but would be an excellent topic to 
expand upon, would be the identification of a windowing approach for real-time detection. For 
the most part, the analysis within this thesis as well as in the previous works of Chea [3] or 
Madtha et al. [2] have been performed on a dataset of all frames captured during the entirety 
of an experiment’s duration. When attempting to detect anomalies in real-time on an active 
network, this is of course not possible since as long as the network is up, there will never be a 
natural point where frame generation halts. As such, many detection methods employ the use 
of a mechanism known as Windowing. Windowing is a form of processing commonly used 
when analyzing digital signals, where a small subset is taken out of a larger dataset for 
processing and analysis. The challenge is, of course, knowing how large of a window size to 
take. A windowing approach with a scenario broken into five 60-second windows was 
conducted, but not expanded upon in-depth. The results of the F-Score calculations for this 
rudimentary windowing approach have been included in Appendix B. 
 Finally, further work into the validation of the F-Score mechanic could be performed by 
comparing the calculated threshold range against those calculated through the use of several 
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machine learning algorithms. Other possible solutions which were considered and could be 
explored include: Markov Chains, Bayesian modelling, and K-means. Given that there is only 
one feature (Hamming Distance) used for the detection method described in this work, 
approaching other Machine Learning methods would be superfluous. This means that 
additional features may be explored to further strengthen threshold predictions.  
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Appendix A 
























crc32V1=[1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1]; 





%crcCalV1=comm.CRCGenerator(crc32V1,'InitialConditions',[1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1],'ReflectInputBytes',true,'ReflectChecksums',true,'FinalXOR',[1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1]); 
%crcCalV2=comm.CRCGenerator(crc32V2,'InitialConditions',[1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1],'ReflectInputBytes',true,'ReflectChecksums',true,'FinalXOR',[1 1 1 1 1 1 1 





%run through the fGood file to get the frame error 
fFER=fopen('isFCSGood.dat','r'); 
fCount=1; 
isGood = fgetl(fFER); 
 




    if(isGood=='0') 
        tally = tally + 1; 
    end 
     
    isGood = fgetl(fFER); 
    fCount=fCount+1; 







percentageCorr=[0 actualCorr 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 
85 90 95 100]; 
  
  




strFNSample=strcat('TestTrainSample_',subScenarioName2); %stores frames as 




fSOut = fopen(strFSNameOut,'wt'); 
%fprintf(fSOut,'           0.5MB            2.5MB            5.0MB     \n'); 
%fprintf(fSOut,'FER% OptimalThreshold  OptimalThreshold OptimalThreshold\n'); 
fprintf(fSOut,'%10s\n',subScenarioName); 
  
for corrVal = 1:22 
    ferNum = num2str(percentageCorr(corrVal)); 
    strFNameOut = strcat(strFNames,'_FE',ferNum,'.txt'); 
    strFMNameOut=strcat(strFMName,'_FE',ferNum,'.txt'); 
    strFMANameOut=strcat(strFMAName,'_FE',ferNum,'.txt'); 
     
     
    falsePos = [0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0]; 
    trueNeg = [0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0]; 
    falseNeg = [0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0]; 
    truePos = [0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0]; 
    strFName=('adHocMatlabInput.dat'); 
    fInput = fopen(strFName,'r'); 
    fGood = fopen('isFCSGood.dat','r'); 
    fProto = fopen('protoFile.dat','r'); 
    fSINR = fopen('SINRFile.dat','r'); 
    fOut = fopen(strFNameOut,'wt'); 
    fprintf(fOut,'%-10s %-32s %-32s %-19s %-16s %-
6s\n',strH1,strH2,strH3,strH6,strH7,strH8); 
    tline = fgetl(fInput); 
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    isFCSGood = fgetl(fGood); 
    protoType = fgetl(fProto); 
    SNRstr = fgetl(fSINR); 
    cc=1; 
    TotFrames=0; 
    TotGFrames=0; 
    TotCorFrames=0; 
    TotFTP=0; 
     
    isFTPLast=0; %0 not started yet, >0 save last seen frame number, start 
saving to array 
    sampleHDArray=[]; %after end of frames save to file from index 1 to 
(sizeofArray-(cc-ftp last)) 
    sampleClassArray=[]; %0-nonSC-NORMAL, 1-SC-FTP 
    sampleIndex=1; 
    %otherCC=1; 
  
    while ischar(tline) 
        protoName = 'NORMAL'; 
        matchFTP=strcmp('1337',protoType); 
        matchTCP=strcmp('80',protoType); 
        if(isFCSGood=='1' && (matchTCP==1 || matchFTP==1)) %when isGoodFile 1 
then good(True), 0 is bad(False) 
            TotFrames= TotFrames+1; %track total frames 
         
            ascVer=uint8(tline); 
            asTemp=ascVer-48; 
            X=double(asTemp); 
            m=X'; 
                 
            G1=step(crcCalV1,m); %calculate the default CRC on all frames 
            fcsPartV1=(G1(end-31:end))'; %get the good FCS part 
     
            if(matchTCP==1) 
                protoName='NORMAL'; 
            elseif(matchFTP==1) 
                isFTPLast=sampleIndex; %we have seen a ftp save the frame 
number and start saving to array 
                protoName ='FTP'; 
                G1=step(crcCalV2,m); %calculate the koopman CRC as SC 
            end 
            SNRValue = str2num(SNRstr); 
            r=rand; 
            if(r>=0 && r<(percentageCorr(corrVal)/100)) 
                TotCorFrames=TotCorFrames+1; %track all corrupted frames 
             
                %B1=bsc(G1,0.05); %send the G1 through the BSC 
                crcMod=awgn(G1,SNRValue); 
                B1=step(deModulation,crcMod); %send the G1 through the AWGN 
                %disp('B1') 
            elseif (r>(percentageCorr(corrVal)/100) && r<=1) 
                TotGFrames=TotGFrames+1; %track all good frames 
             
                B1=G1; 
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            end 
         
            fcsPartB1=(B1(end-31:end))'; 
         
            %do some Hamming calculation for each FCS value 
            hamV1vsB1 = binArray2HammingD(fcsPartV1,fcsPartB1); 
            %hamV1vsV2 = binArray2HammingD(fcsPartV1,fcsPartV2); 
            %hamV1vsV3 = binArray2HammingD(fcsPartV1,fcsPartV3); 
                          
            fprintf(fOut,'%-10d',cc); %'Frame#' 
            fprintf(fOut,' '); 
            fprintf(fOut,'%-d',fcsPartV1); %'CRCPoly:0x04C11DB7(d)' 
            fprintf(fOut,' '); 
            fprintf(fOut,'%-d',fcsPartB1); %'CRCPoly:Recieved(FCS)' 
            fprintf(fOut,' '); 
            fprintf(fOut,'%-19d',hamV1vsB1); %'Calculated HD' 
            fprintf(fOut,' '); 
            fprintf(fOut,'%-16s',protoName); %'Protocol' 
            fprintf(fOut,' '); 
         
            if(hamV1vsB1==0) 
                fprintf(fOut,'Good'); %'isGood' 
                fprintf(fOut,'\n'); 
                %otherCC=otherCC-1; %must take one from the total because its 
not saving in out array 
            else 
                if(isFTPLast>0) %start saving frames HD to array we only want 
bad 
                    sampleHDArray(sampleIndex)=hamV1vsB1; 
                    if(matchTCP==1) 
                        sampleClassArray(sampleIndex)=0; 
                    elseif(matchFTP==1) 
                        sampleClassArray(sampleIndex)=1; 
                    end 
                    sampleIndex=sampleIndex+1; 
                end 
                fprintf(fOut,'Bad'); %'isGood' 
                fprintf(fOut,'\n'); 
            end 
         
            if(matchTCP==1) 
                %protoName='NORMAL'; 
                for threshold = 1:30 
                                                
                    if(hamV1vsB1<=threshold)%True-: Correctly identified Non 
SC frame as Non SC NORMALHD<=Threshold 
                        tempVal = trueNeg(threshold); 
                        trueNeg(threshold) = tempVal + 1; 
                    elseif(hamV1vsB1>threshold)%False+:Incorrectly Identified 
non SC frame as SC NORMALHD>Threshold 
                        tempVal = falsePos(threshold); 
                        falsePos(threshold) = tempVal + 1; 
                    end  
                end 
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            elseif(matchFTP==1) 
                TotFTP=TotFTP+1; %track FTP frames 
                %protoName ='FTP'; 
                for threshold = 1:30 
                    if(hamV1vsB1>threshold)%True+:Correctly identified SC 
frame as SC FTPHD>Threshold 
                        tempVal = truePos(threshold); 
                        truePos(threshold) = tempVal + 1; 
                    elseif(hamV1vsB1<=threshold)%False-:Incorrectly 
identified Non SC frame as SC FTPHD<=Threshold 
                        tempVal = falseNeg(threshold); 
                        falseNeg(threshold) = tempVal + 1; 
                    end 
                end  
            end 
        end 
        tline = fgetl(fInput); 
        isFCSGood = fgetl(fGood); 
        protoType = fgetl(fProto); 
        SNRstr = fgetl(fSINR); 
        matchFTP=0; 
        matchTCP=0; 
        cc=cc+1; 
        %otherCC=otherCC+1; 
    end 
    fclose(fProto); 
    fclose(fGood); 
    fclose(fOut); 
    fclose(fInput); 
    fclose(fSINR); 
  
    strMH1='Threshold'; 
    strMH2='True(+)'; 
    strMH3='False(+)'; 
    strMH4='True(-)'; 
    strMH5='False(-)'; 
    strMH6='Accuracy'; 
    strMH7='Sensitivity'; 
    strMH8='Specificity'; 
    strMH9='Precision'; 
    strMH10='F-Score'; 
  
    fMOut = fopen(strFMNameOut,'wt'); 
    fprintf(fMOut,'%-9s %-7s %-8s %-7s %-8s %-8s %-11s %-11s %-9s %-
7s(FER=%3s%%)\n',strMH1,strMH2,strMH3,strMH4,strMH5,strMH6,strMH7,strMH8,strM
H9,strMH10,ferNum); 
     
    bThresh = 0; 
    bFScore = 0; 
  
    for x = 1:30 
     
        %TP=truePos(x)/TotFTP; 
        %TN=trueNeg(x)/(TotGFrames+TotCorFrames); 
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        %FP=falsePos(x)/(TotGFrames+TotCorFrames); 
        %FN=falseNeg(x)/TotFTP; 
     
        TP=truePos(x); 
        TN=trueNeg(x); 
        FP=falsePos(x); 
        FN=falseNeg(x); 
     
     
        %Precision = Positive Predictive Value (PPV) = TP/TP+FP [missing from 
your equations] 
        %Recall = Sensitivity = True Positive Rate (TPR) = TP/TP+FN 
        %Specificity = True Negative Rate (TNR) = TN/TN+FP 
  
     
        %accuracy = ((TP+TN)/(TP+TN+FP+FN)); 
        %sensitivity = (TP/(TP+FN)); 
        %specificity = (TN/(TN+FP)); 
        %Precision = (TP/(TP+FP)); 
     
        accuracy = (TP+TN)/(TP+TN+FP+FN); 
        sensitivity = TP/(TP+FN); 
        specificity = TN/(TN+FP); 
        precision = TP/(TP+FP); 
        fScore = (2*precision*sensitivity)/(precision+sensitivity); 
         
         
        if(fScore > bFScore) 
           bThresh=x; 
           bFScore=fScore; 
        end 
        fprintf(fMOut,'%-9d',x);  
        fprintf(fMOut,' '); 
        fprintf(fMOut,'%-7d',TP); 
        fprintf(fMOut,' '); 
        fprintf(fMOut,'%-8d',FP);  
        fprintf(fMOut,' '); 
        fprintf(fMOut,'%-7d',TN);  
        fprintf(fMOut,' '); 
        fprintf(fMOut,'%-8d',FN); 
        fprintf(fMOut,' '); 
        fprintf(fMOut,'%-8.4f',accuracy); 
        fprintf(fMOut,' '); 
        fprintf(fMOut,'%-11.4f',sensitivity); 
        fprintf(fMOut,' '); 
        fprintf(fMOut,'%-11.4f',specificity); 
        fprintf(fMOut,' '); 
        fprintf(fMOut,'%-9.4f',precision); 
        fprintf(fMOut,' '); 
        fprintf(fMOut,'%-15.4f',fScore); 
        fprintf(fMOut,'\n'); 
    end 
    fclose(fMOut); 
 




    fMAOut = fopen(strFMANameOut,'wt'); 
    if (corrVal==1) 
        fprintf(fMAOut,'Percentage of Actual Corrupted packets in Capture: %-
6.4f \n',actualCorr); 
    end 
    fprintf(fMAOut,'Percentage of Simulated Corrupted packets: %-6.4f 
\n',percentageCorr(corrVal)); 
    fprintf(fMAOut,'Total Frames: %d \n',TotFrames); 
    fprintf(fMAOut,'Total Good Frames: %d \n',TotGFrames); 
    fprintf(fMAOut,'Total Corrupted Frames: %d \n',TotCorFrames); 
    fprintf(fMAOut,'Total FTP Frames (Side-Channel): %d \n',TotFTP); 
    if(bThresh>0) 
        fprintf(fMAOut,'Best Threshold: %d',bThresh); 
        fprintf(fMAOut,'Best Threshold: %1.4f',bFScore); 
        fprintf(fSOut, '%10d\n',bThresh); 
    else 
       fprintf(fMAOut,'No Threshold found \n'); 
       fprintf(fSOut, '%10d\n',0); 
    end 
     
    fclose(fMAOut); 
    fSampleOut = fopen(strFNSampleOut,'at'); 
    %isFTPStop=sampleIndex-(otherCC-isFTPStart); 
    ind=1; 
    while ind<(isFTPLast+1) 
        if((isFTPLast-ind)>0) 
            fprintf(fSampleOut,'%d %d\n', 
sampleHDArray(ind),sampleClassArray(ind)); 
        else 
            fprintf(fSampleOut,'%d %d\n', 
sampleHDArray(ind),sampleClassArray(ind)); 
        end 
        ind=ind+1; 
    end 
     
    fclose(fSampleOut); 
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Appendix B 
F-Score Calculations for Window Scenario 1 




(-) Accuracy Sensitivity Specificity Precision 
F-Score 
(FER=25%) 
1 0 136 399 0 0.7458 0.0000 0.7458 0.0000 0.0000 
2 0 135 400 0 0.7477 0.0000 0.7477 0.0000 0.0000 
3 0 134 401 0 0.7495 0.0000 0.7495 0.0000 0.0000 
4 0 123 412 0 0.7701 0.0000 0.7701 0.0000 0.0000 
5 0 111 424 0 0.7925 0.0000 0.7925 0.0000 0.0000 
6 0 96 439 0 0.8206 0.0000 0.8206 0.0000 0.0000 
7 0 77 458 0 0.8561 0.0000 0.8561 0.0000 0.0000 
8 0 54 481 0 0.8991 0.0000 0.8991 0.0000 0.0000 
9 0 31 504 0 0.9421 0.0000 0.9421 0.0000 0.0000 
10 0 12 523 0 0.9776 0.0000 0.9776 0.0000 0.0000 
11 0 7 528 0 0.9869 0.0000 0.9869 0.0000 0.0000 
12 0 2 533 0 0.996262 0.0000 0.9963 0.0000 0.0000 
13 0 2 533 0 0.9963 0.0000 0.9963 0.0000 0.0000 
14 0 0 535 0 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
15 0 0 535 0 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
16 0 0 535 0 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
17 0 0 535 0 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
18 0 0 535 0 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
19 0 0 535 0 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
20 0 0 535 0 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
21 0 0 535 0 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
22 0 0 535 0 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
23 0 0 535 0 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
24 0 0 535 0 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
25 0 0 535 0 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
26 0 0 535 0 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
27 0 0 535 0 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
28 0 0 535 0 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
29 0 0 535 0 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
30 0 0 535 0 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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1 150 101 285 0 0.8116 1.0000 0.7383 0.5976 0.7481 
2 150 101 285 0 0.8116 1.0000 0.7383 0.5976 0.7481 
3 150 99 287 0 0.8153 1.0000 0.7435 0.6024 0.7519 
4 150 95 291 0 0.8228 1.0000 0.7539 0.6122 0.7595 
5 150 84 302 0 0.8433 1.0000 0.7824 0.6410 0.7813 
6 150 69 317 0 0.8713 1.0000 0.8212 0.6849 0.8130 
7 150 55 331 0 0.8974 1.0000 0.8575 0.7317 0.8451 
8 150 35 351 0 0.9347 1.0000 0.9093 0.8108 0.8955 
9 150 25 361 0 0.9534 1.0000 0.9352 0.8571 0.9231 
10 147 14 372 3 0.9683 0.9800 0.9637 0.9130 0.9453 
11 143 9 377 7 0.9701 0.9533 0.9767 0.9408 0.9470 
12 137 4 382 13 0.9683 0.9133 0.9896 0.9716 0.9416 
13 124 1 385 26 0.9496 0.8267 0.9974 0.9920 0.9018 
14 110 0 386 40 0.9254 0.7333 1.0000 1.0000 0.8462 
15 87 0 386 63 0.8825 0.5800 1.0000 1.0000 0.7342 
16 63 0 386 87 0.8377 0.4200 1.0000 1.0000 0.5915 
17 44 0 386 106 0.8022 0.2933 1.0000 1.0000 0.4536 
18 32 0 386 118 0.7799 0.2133 1.0000 1.0000 0.3516 
19 22 0 386 128 0.7612 0.1467 1.0000 1.0000 0.2558 
20 10 0 386 140 0.7388 0.0667 1.0000 1.0000 0.1250 
21 4 0 386 146 0.7276 0.0267 1.0000 1.0000 0.0519 
22 2 0 386 148 0.7239 0.0133 1.0000 1.0000 0.0263 
23 0 0 386 150 0.7201 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
24 0 0 386 150 0.7201 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
25 0 0 386 150 0.7201 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
26 0 0 386 150 0.7201 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
27 0 0 386 150 0.7201 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
28 0 0 386 150 0.7201 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
29 0 0 386 150 0.7201 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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F-Score Calculations for Window Scenario 3 




(-) Accuracy Sensitivity Specificity Precision 
F-Score 
(FER=25%) 
1 196 85 255 0 0.8414 1.0000 0.7500 0.6975 0.8218 
2 196 85 255 0 0.8414 1.0000 0.7500 0.6975 0.8218 
3 196 84 256 0 0.8433 1.0000 0.7529 0.7000 0.8235 
4 196 81 259 0 0.8489 1.0000 0.7618 0.7076 0.8288 
5 196 75 265 0 0.8601 1.0000 0.7794 0.7232 0.8394 
6 196 61 279 0 0.8862 1.0000 0.8206 0.7626 0.8653 
7 196 44 296 0 0.9179 1.0000 0.8706 0.8167 0.8991 
8 196 29 311 0 0.9459 1.0000 0.9147 0.8711 0.9311 
9 195 21 319 1 0.9590 0.9949 0.9382 0.9028 0.9466 
10 194 18 322 2 0.9627 0.9898 0.9471 0.9151 0.9510 
11 190 11 329 6 0.9683 0.9694 0.9676 0.9453 0.9572 
12 173 1 339 23 0.9552 0.8827 0.9971 0.9943 0.9351 
13 159 1 339 37 0.9291 0.8112 0.9971 0.9938 0.8933 
14 145 0 340 51 0.9049 0.7398 1.0000 1.0000 0.8504 
15 123 0 340 73 0.8638 0.6276 1.0000 1.0000 0.7712 
16 89 0 340 107 0.8004 0.4541 1.0000 1.0000 0.6246 
17 64 0 340 132 0.7537 0.3265 1.0000 1.0000 0.4923 
18 39 0 340 157 0.7071 0.1990 1.0000 1.0000 0.3319 
19 25 0 340 171 0.6810 0.1276 1.0000 1.0000 0.2262 
20 7 0 340 189 0.6474 0.0357 1.0000 1.0000 0.0690 
21 3 0 340 193 0.6399 0.0153 1.0000 1.0000 0.0302 
22 1 0 340 195 0.6362 0.0051 1.0000 1.0000 0.0102 
23 1 0 340 195 0.6362 0.0051 1.0000 1.0000 0.0102 
24 0 0 340 196 0.6343 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
25 0 0 340 196 0.6343 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
26 0 0 340 196 0.6343 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
27 0 0 340 196 0.6343 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
28 0 0 340 196 0.6343 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
29 0 0 340 196 0.6343 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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F-Score Calculations for Window Scenario 4 




) Accuracy Sensitivity Specificity Precision 
F-Score 
(FER=25%) 
1 18 142 377 0 0.7356 1.0000 0.7264 0.1125 0.2022 
2 18 140 379 0 0.7393 1.0000 0.7303 0.1139 0.2045 
3 18 137 382 0 0.7449 1.0000 0.7360 0.1161 0.2081 
4 18 130 389 0 0.7579 1.0000 0.7495 0.1216 0.2169 
5 18 117 402 0 0.7821 1.0000 0.7746 0.1333 0.2353 
6 18 103 416 0 0.8082 1.0000 0.8015 0.1488 0.2590 
7 18 80 439 0 0.8510 1.0000 0.8459 0.1837 0.3103 
8 18 54 465 0 0.8994 1.0000 0.8960 0.2500 0.4000 
9 18 35 484 0 0.9348 1.0000 0.9326 0.3396 0.5070 
10 18 17 502 0 0.9683 1.0000 0.9672 0.5143 0.6792 
11 17 4 515 1 0.9907 0.9444 0.9923 0.8095 0.8718 
12 16 1 518 2 0.9944 0.8889 0.9981 0.9412 0.9143 
13 16 1 518 2 0.9944 0.8889 0.9981 0.9412 0.9143 
14 14 0 519 4 0.9926 0.7778 1.0000 1.0000 0.8750 
15 12 0 519 6 0.9888 0.6667 1.0000 1.0000 0.8000 
16 9 0 519 9 0.9832 0.5000 1.0000 1.0000 0.6667 
17 6 0 519 12 0.9777 0.3333 1.0000 1.0000 0.5000 
18 4 0 519 14 0.9739 0.2222 1.0000 1.0000 0.3636 
19 1 0 519 17 0.9683 0.0556 1.0000 1.0000 0.1053 
20 0 0 519 18 0.9665 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
21 0 0 519 18 0.9665 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
22 0 0 519 18 0.9665 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
23 0 0 519 18 0.9665 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
24 0 0 519 18 0.9665 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
25 0 0 519 18 0.9665 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
26 0 0 519 18 0.9665 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
27 0 0 519 18 0.9665 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
28 0 0 519 18 0.9665 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
29 0 0 519 18 0.9665 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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F-Score Calculations for Window Scenario 5 




) Accuracy Sensitivity Specificity Precision 
F-
Score(FER=25%) 
1 0 128 410 0 0.7621 0.0000 0.7621 0.0000 0.0000 
2 0 128 410 0 0.7621 0.0000 0.7621 0.0000 0.0000 
3 0 128 410 0 0.7621 0.0000 0.7621 0.0000 0.0000 
4 0 125 413 0 0.7677 0.0000 0.7677 0.0000 0.0000 
5 0 113 425 0 0.7900 0.0000 0.7900 0.0000 0.0000 
6 0 97 441 0 0.8197 0.0000 0.8197 0.0000 0.0000 
7 0 84 454 0 0.8439 0.0000 0.8439 0.0000 0.0000 
8 0 56 482 0 0.8959 0.0000 0.8959 0.0000 0.0000 
9 0 38 500 0 0.9294 0.0000 0.9294 0.0000 0.0000 
10 0 19 519 0 0.9647 0.0000 0.9647 0.0000 0.0000 
11 0 13 525 0 0.9758 0.0000 0.9758 0.0000 0.0000 
12 0 6 532 0 0.9888 0.0000 0.9888 0.0000 0.0000 
13 0 3 535 0 0.9944 0.0000 0.9944 0.0000 0.0000 
14 0 2 536 0 0.9963 0.0000 0.9963 0.0000 0.0000 
15 0 0 538 0 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
16 0 0 538 0 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
17 0 0 538 0 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
18 0 0 538 0 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
19 0 0 538 0 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
20 0 0 538 0 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
21 0 0 538 0 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
22 0 0 538 0 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
23 0 0 538 0 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
24 0 0 538 0 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
25 0 0 538 0 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
26 0 0 538 0 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
27 0 0 538 0 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
28 0 0 538 0 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
29 0 0 538 0 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
30 0 0 538 0 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Appendix C 
SVM Model Output File 
SVM-light Version V6.02 
0 # kernel type 
3 # kernel parameter -d  
1 # kernel parameter -g  
1 # kernel parameter -s  
1 # kernel parameter -r  
empty# kernel parameter -u  
1 # highest feature index  
2680 # number of training documents  
11 # number of support vectors plus 1  
11.4559208 # threshold b, each following line is a SV (starting with alpha*y) 
-0.20084786523640671407342495058401 1:9 #Normal 
0.20084786523640671407342495058401 1:11 #Side-Channel 
-0.20084786523640671407342495058401 1:10 #Normal 
0.20084786523640671407342495058401 1:9 #Side-Channel 
-0.20084786523640671407342495058401 1:9 #Normal 
0.20084786523640671407342495058401 1:11 #Side-Channel 
-0.20084786523640671407342495058401 1:9 #Normal 
0.20084786523640671407342495058401 1:12 #Side-Channel 
-0.19850157887958630453795194625854 1:9 #Normal 
0.19850157887935893086250871419907 1:12 #Side-Channel 
 
 
